The Periphery Strikes Back

Democratic Breakdown through Civic Organizations in Interwar Japan

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Abstract. Parties and the military are democracy's two gatekeepers: when both exclude radicals, democracy should survive. Interwar Japan defies this expectation. Established parties controlled parliament and the military contained its radical faction, yet democracy collapsed. I show that radicals circumvented both gates by building civic organizations. Drawing on monthly data on right-wing associations across all prefectures, I find that the May 1932 assassination of the prime minister triggered an organizational surge in a peripheral region excluded from the governing coalition since the 1868 Restoration. The surge concentrated among organizations propagating an anti-parliamentary doctrine of party dissolution and direct imperial rule. This infrastructure proved durable: it supplied violence participants for a decade and survived the army's purge of its own radical faction. Sharing an organization with a prior violence participant sharply raised an individual's probability of crossing into violence, robust to excluding named ideologues: rank-and-file peer ties, not ideologue recruitment, propagated participation.

1. Introduction

Democratic breakdown follows two pathways (Svolik 2014): parties bring radicals into government, or the military seizes power. Each pathway has a gatekeeper. Parties exclude radicals from legislative power (Bermeo 2016; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019); the military hierarchy contains its own radical faction (Geddes 1999; Powell 2012). When both gates hold, the conventional pathways to breakdown are closed.

This paper shows that radicals locked out of both institutions can still damage democracy by organizing outside them. Interwar Japan held both gates—and democracy collapsed anyway. Two established parties retained firm control of parliament, without the conservative fragmentation (Bermeo 2016) or socialist threat (Acemoglu et al. 2022)

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that opened the door for fascists in Germany and Italy. The military was divided, but the moderate mainstream blocked the radical faction's pathway: when radicals attempted coups, the mainstream refused to rally and the plots collapsed (Kitaoka 2021, pp. 117–120; Shillony 1973). Neither institutional channel was breached from below, yet democracy fell.

Locked out of both formal paths, radical officers and agrarian nationalist ideologues turned to civic organizations as both an organizational base and a vehicle for participation. Drawing on a monthly prefecture-level panel of over 4,000 right-wing organizations, I find that grassroots organizational density in Japan's northern periphery nearly doubled within twelve months of the May 1932 assassination of the prime minister, while two years of severe depression had produced no differential mobilization. Organizations propagating *Shōwa Restoration* (a program of party dissolution, direct imperial rule, and national reconstruction that the February 1936 rebels invoked) built the recruitment base. Across the broader right-wing organizational network, sharing an active organization with a prior violence participant raised individuals' own probability of crossing into violence: civic networks transmitted not only doctrine but participation itself. Named coup-plot figures appear in the post-shock NP organization rosters; the Wakamatsu Kōdō Ishinjuku academy alone had five of ten members implicated in the February 1936 conspiracy. After the coup, the army formalized an absolute veto over cabinet formation, ending party governance.

This strategy took root in Japan's northern periphery, a "left behind" region (Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Royer and Leibert 2024) whose feudal domains lost the 1868 Boshin War and were excluded from the governing coalition, leaving durable anti-centralist grievance. The May 1932 perpetrators—radical officers and agrarian nationalists—explicitly named the northeast as the region most victimized by central-government policy in their court martial testimony (Chūseidō 1934, pp. 8–13), aligning their rhetoric with this preexisting cleavage (Snow et al. 1986). The event-study estimates are flat throughout the pre-period, including through the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, and rise discontinuously at May 1932. The mobilization was ideologically specific: a triple-difference shows that the surge concentrated disproportionately among organizations espousing the anti-democratic program (party dissolution and direct imperial rule) aligned with the Imperial Way faction (*Kōdōha*)—the radical military faction the army's moderate mainstream had blocked.

Two further analyses identify which organizational features and which person-level ties carry the violence-supply signal. A cross-sectional negative binomial across all right-wing organizations finds that having a past-perpetrator co-membership tie raises the expected count of violence participants by roughly a factor of nine, with named-ideologue presence, military membership, and the Imperial Way keyword as smaller but independent contributions. A person-month TWFE panel (701,530 person-months across 12,404 named persons) finds that sharing an active organization with someone who has already participated in violence raises the monthly probability of crossing into violence roughly fourfold ($p = 0.023$, robust to dropping the 15 named ideologues at $p = 0.037$). The structural-network position, not the doctrinal label or any named broker, predicts violence supply at both grains.

These findings make three contributions. First, the paper identifies a pathway to democratic breakdown that operates entirely outside formal institutions and succeeds even when both gatekeepers hold. Anti-democratic civic mobilization is a recognized precursor to authoritarian transitions (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023), but the European cases that anchor the comparative literature involved fascist movements colonizing preexisting civic networks (Berman 1997; Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth 2017). Japan's radicals lacked that option: state-directed associations monopolized rural organizational life (Smethurst 2019), leaving no existing networks to colonize and forcing radicals into what Paxton (1966) calls *rooting*—building new organizations from scratch. Existing democratic erosion frameworks center on incumbents who exploit their office (Bernhard 2020) or opposition elites competing through formal channels (Bennett and Livingston 2025); Japan's case falls outside both. The mechanism is not colonization of civil society but construction of it.

Second, the paper provides temporal leverage on the center-periphery cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) that existing cross-sectional designs cannot. Peripheral status is increasingly recognized as a driver of radical-right support (Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Royer and Leibert 2024; Ziblatt, Hilbig, and Bischof 2024), but peripherality correlates with poverty and sectoral decline (Acemoglu et al. 2022; Colantone and Stanig 2018), making the two difficult to separate. Two years of severe depression produced no differential mobilization in the northern periphery, but a single political assassination framed in anti-centralist terms triggered an immediate organizational surge—distinguishing the political-identity dimension from the economic one within the same region and time period.

Third, the paper revises grievance-activation accounts of radical mobilization. Existing work treats the cleavage-frame match as sufficient (Correa, Nandong, and Shadmehr 2024; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Vries and Hobolt 2020); the Japanese case shows it is necessary but not sufficient. The same agrarian-nationalist frame circulated nationally, yet the mobilizational response concentrated geographically where historical-political exclusion gave anti-centralist nationalism local salience (DE MESQUITA 2010). The mechanism requires a pre-existing political identity tied to specific historical experience, separating geographic specificity from cleavage-frame congruence.

2. Propagating the Doctrine

2.1. Treatment: May 15 Incident

The May 15 assassination reveals how radical ideology traveled from its creators to communities that had never encountered its authors. On May 15, 1932, young naval officers, army cadets, and civilian agrarian nationalists assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and attacked the Metropolitan Police headquarters and the Bank of Japan (Shillony 1973; Siniawer 2008). The conspirators drew on the agrarian nationalism of Gondō Seikyō (from Fukuoka) and Tachibana Kōzaburō (based in Ibaraki), framing rural hardship as betrayal by a central government that exploited agriculture to fuel industrialization (Havens 1974, pp. 163–178). Neither ideologue was from the northern periphery, yet the movement took root there rather than in Fukuoka or Ibaraki—what mattered was not proximity to the ideologues but whether the local population already possessed the identity the ideology addressed. Their rallying cry was *Shōwa Restoration*, the slogan that would define the Imperial Way faction and animate the February 26 rebels four years later (Siniawer 2008, pp. 133–134).

The assassination was designed to ignite mass mobilization, not to seize power. The conspirators' manifesto called on "farmers, workers, and all the people" to rise (Shillony 1973, p. 21), and the perpetrators named the northeast (*Tōhoku*) as the region most victimized by central-government policy in their court martial testimony (Chūseidō 1934, pp. 8–13). The military refused to rally and the coup collapsed, but the event did not need to succeed as a coup to function as a focal shock. A cascade of radical violence—the Hamaguchi shooting (November 1930), foiled coups in 1931, and the Blood Pledge League assassinations of February–March 1932 (Kitaoka 2021, pp. 178–179)—had already linked agrarian grievance to anti-establishment terrorism in public consciousness. Press censorship was imposed the following day (Kishino 1995, pp. 18–19), but the assassination and the agrarian-nationalist identity of the perpetrators were public before censorship took effect, and the preceding violence had established the interpretive frame through which the event was understood. The mobilization response accumulated over months and years (as the event study confirms), consistent with diffusion through organizational networks rather than a reaction requiring immediate access to the perpetrators' manifesto.

2.2. Treatment Group: Northern Periphery

Peripheral status, not geography or poverty, determined where the May 15 shock activated radical mobilization. The perpetrators' agrarian nationalism (*nōhon-shugi*) circulated throughout Japan's rice belt (Havens 1974), but it resonated only where communities already possessed an anti-centralist identity that predated the modern state —where peripheral status generated receptiveness to anti-center mobilization (Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Royer and Leibert 2024). The Seiyūkai and Minseitō drew electoral support from rural notables in the northeast but provided little material response to the agrarian crisis (Luebbert 1991), leaving farming communities available for radical mobilization.

The treatment indicator is membership in seven prefectures (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, and Niigata) highlighted in Figure 1. All seven belong to the historic domains of the *Ōuetsu Reppan Dōmei* (Northern Alliance), the coalition of



Figure 1: Northern Periphery

Note: Filled: northern periphery (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, Niigata). Bordered: metropolitan (Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa, Kyoto, Aichi, Hyogo).

northeastern feudal lords that opposed the Meiji Restoration forces in the Boshin War of 1868. The Alliance was a hastily assembled wartime coalition, not a pre-existing political community: Sendai (Miyagi) was a powerful domain with substantial post-Restoration agency, while Akita initially fought against the Alliance before being pressured to join. The Meiji state's response varied in severity—from punitive dissolution of domains like Aizu to more lenient treatment of Akita—but the region as a whole was excluded from the governing coalition and neglected in early statebuilding, creating a shared structural position as peripheral subjects of a government imposed by southwestern victors (Harada and Kubota 2025). That identity persisted into the twentieth century. The May 15 perpetrators explicitly identified the northeast as the locus of central-government exploitation in their court martial testimony (Chūseidō 1934, pp. 8–13), providing a direct basis for treating these prefectures as the region most exposed to the shock's ideological content.[2]

This ideological resonance was not merely rhetorical: it was organizational. The *Mutsu Kokoku Dōshikai* (Mutsu National Revival Comrades' Association), founded in Aomori in February 1932 with sixty members, illustrates the mechanism: national

[2]Niigata is not included in the conventional Tōhoku regional classification but belongs to the Northern Alliance through the Nagaoka domain. Niigata prefecture also included domains that fought on the Meiji government's side; the leave-one-out check (Appendix C.3) shows the NP coefficient strengthens when Niigata is dropped, consistent with its mixed allegiance attenuating rather than driving the result.

ideology translated into local organizational form. Its charter combined the standard Imperial Way program (divine restoration, direct imperial rule, Shōwa Restoration) with demands specific to the northeast: rural salvation, northern border defense, and clemency for the Blood League and May 15 defendants. By May 1932, its founders had established a 270-member farmers' movement arm under the guidance of nationalist writer Nagano Akira, embedding radical ideology in a vehicle that addressed the material grievances of Tohoku's farming communities. The pattern recurred across the northern periphery: national ideologues supplied the doctrinal framework, and local organizers adapted it to regional grievance.

Other prefectures shared the economic conditions (rice dependence, depression-era hardship) but lacked the structural peripheralization that made agrarian nationalism's anti-center framing resonate as a diagnosis of their own experience. The northern periphery exhibits all four dimensions of peripheralization (Royer and Leibert 2024): selective out-migration, disconnection from political decision-making, dependency on a central government that directed investment elsewhere, and discursive stigmatization as a backward, defeated region. The treatment is membership in a region defined by peripheral status itself, not by geography alone or by downstream economic structure.

2.3. Outcome: Grassroots Right-Wing Organization Density

The data used throughout this paper come from a comprehensive registry of right-wing organizations compiled by Nagata (2014), which records founding and dissolution dates, membership lists, and stated purposes for over 4,000 organizations active between 1868 and 1945. The registry contains both grassroots organizations and those with military officer affiliations; this paper restricts attention to grassroots organizations to isolate the mobilization channel.

Organizational density—the count of active grassroots right-wing organizations per 100,000 population in a prefecture-month—measures the mobilization channel directly: local actors choosing to organize around radical ideology. The variable excludes government-affiliated bodies (veterans' associations administered by the Home Ministry, reservist branches, and similar state-sponsored entities) and faction-affiliated organizations. State-directed organizations (the Imperial Military Reservist Association, the Greater Japan Youth Association, and youth training centers) enrolled millions of members through 14,000 branches reaching virtually every hamlet (Smethurst 2019), but they promoted army loyalism and national unity, not the Imperial Way program of party dissolution and direct imperial rule. Excluding them and the officer-affiliated organizations separates grassroots mobilization from pre-existing state infrastructure.[3] The measure is a stock: it counts every organization whose founding date falls on or before the period and whose dissolution date (if any) falls after it.

Figure 2 plots organizational density for the northern periphery (solid) and other non-metropolitan prefectures (dashed). Both groups rose gradually before May 1932, with the northern periphery initially at or below the non-metropolitan average. After the assassination, the periphery's trajectory steepened, overtaking the comparison group and opening a growing gap through the prewar period. The geographic concentration of this acceleration—in the periphery rather than across all economically distressed areas



Figure 2: Northern Periphery Diverges After the May 15 Incident

Note: Monthly mean of grassroots right-wing organizations per 100,000 population. Solid: northern periphery (all seven treated prefectures); dashed: other non-metropolitan prefectures. Dashed vertical line marks May 1932.

[3] The DDD result in Table 2 provides a further distinction: the post-shock surge was disproportionately Imperial Way, a factional specificity that nationally uniform, centrally coordinated state organizations cannot explain.

—together with the change in slope at a political rather than economic shock, points to peripheral status as the operative condition.

The structural-break analysis localizes the dominant break at May 1932 itself. To establish the timing of this divergence without imposing an assumed break point, I apply the structural break methodology of Bai and Perron (1998) and Bai and Perron (2003) to the monthly gap in mean organizational density between northern periphery and other non-metropolitan prefectures. The supremum F statistic is 266.2 ($p < 0.001$), decisively rejecting the null of no structural break, with the maximum located at May 1932, the incident month itself. A forced single-break model places the estimated break at May 1932 with a 90 percent confidence interval of April–June 1932. The BIC-optimal unrestricted model identifies three breaks (March 1931, May 1932, May 1933), with May 1932 consistently among them, marking it as the dominant structural shift in the series, distinct from earlier Depression-era movements and later organizational consolidation. The algorithm pins the dominant organizational break at the month of a single political assassination, not at any point during the preceding agrarian depression.

2.4. Identification Strategy

The design identifies the composite NP effect—the bundle of traits that distinguish the northern periphery—rather than any single component of peripherality in isolation. The region's historical peripheralization correlates with economic vulnerability: exclusion from the governing coalition produced the rice dependence, out-migration, and low income that constitute the proximate conditions. With seven treated prefectures that share Boshin War history, climate, crop mix, and distance from Tokyo, separating this political-historical relationship from its economic correlates is the central identification challenge. The DiD estimates are therefore estimates of this composite.

Two features of the evidence point to which component within the bundle is doing the most work. First, the correlation between peripherality and economic conditions is imperfect: other rice-growing prefectures shared these proximate conditions but lacked the historical identity and did not develop comparable organizational infrastructure. Farm prices "plunged again by 1931 to only two-fifths their 1919 level" nationwide (Havens

1974, p. 136), yet only in the northeast did a mobilizational response materialize. Second, the temporal pattern is informative: two years of severe agrarian depression produced no differential mobilization in the NP (the event study in Figure 4 is flat throughout the pre-period), but the political shock triggered an immediate divergence. The economic channel predicts a gradual response tracking the depression; a channel operating through the region's structural relationship to the state predicts a discontinuous response at a political shock framed in anti-centralist terms. The data match the latter.

One might object that economic hardship created the conditions and the assassination merely triggered them; this cannot explain why other equally distressed prefectures, which experienced the same assassination, did not mobilize. The geographic specificity of the response to a politically framed event points to the identity dimension. The design cannot isolate which dimension of peripheralization (out-migration, political exclusion, economic dependency, or discursive stigmatization) is operative, but the temporal pattern is more consistent with an identity or status-based mechanism than with material hardship alone. A subgroup analysis below further probes this question: NP prefectures outside the 8th Division's jurisdiction, those without radical officer garrisons, also show positive effects, consistent with peripheral identity operating independently of military exposure.

I exploit this variation in a monthly panel of Japan's 47 prefectures from January 1931 to May 1934, where the pre-period captures the early phase of the global depression prior to the May 15, 1932 assassination. Monthly temporal resolution, rare in studies of interwar radicalization, permits precise identification of responses to discrete political events rather than slower-moving economic or institutional trends. I measure five downstream economic conditions at the prefecture level: economic shock (change in per-capita income, 1929–1931), rice dependence (rice production value / gross prefectural product, 1925 base), per-capita income in 1931, sharecropper rate (pure sharecroppers / total sharecropper-plus-owner-cultivator households, 1931),[4] and agriculture dependence (agricultural share of gross value added, 1925). Income data are from the Imperial

[4] The Imperial Statistical Yearbook edition of a given year reports data collected during the preceding calendar year; conditions as of 1931 are thus recorded in the 1932 edition.

Statistical Yearbook, agricultural and industrial output from the Hitotsubashi Database on Gross Prefectural Product in Prewar Japan and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics.

2.4.1. Difference-in-Differences

The baseline specification is a difference-in-differences (DD) regression estimated as a two-way fixed effects (TWFE) model:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{OrgDensity}_{p,t} = \beta\Big(&\text{NorthernPeriphery}_p \times \mathbb{1}_{\{t>T_0\}}\Big) \\ &+\boldsymbol{X}_p'\delta\mathbb{1}_{\{t>T_0\}} + \varphi_p + \psi_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}\end{aligned}$$

where T_0 is May 1932. The dependent variable $\text{OrgDensity}_{p,t}$ is the count of existing grassroots right-wing organizations per 100,000 population in prefecture p in month t. The treatment indicator $\text{NorthernPeriphery}_p$ is a binary variable for prefectures in the northern periphery region, and $\boldsymbol{X}_p$ is a vector of pre-treatment covariates—including a metropolitan indicator, economic shock, rice dependence, tenant rate, per-capita income, agriculture dependence, tenant union density, and landowner union density—interacted with the post indicator. All models include prefecture (φ_p) and month (ψ_t) fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by prefecture and month.

A central identifying assumption is parallel trends: absent the shock, the treatment and control groups would have followed the same trajectory. I assess this using an event-study specification that replaces the single post indicator with relative-time indicators around May 1932:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{OrgDensity}_{p,t} = \sum_{k\neq -1}\beta_k\Big(&\text{NorthernPeriphery}_p \times \mathbb{1}_{\{t-T_0=k\}}\Big) \\ &+\boldsymbol{X}_p'\delta\mathbb{1}_{\{t>T_0\}} + \varphi_p + \psi_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}\end{aligned}$$

where T_0 is May 1932 (the first post-shock month) and $\boldsymbol{X}_p$ includes the same covariates as in the baseline DD. As a further check, Appendix C.4 reports synthetic difference-in-differences (SDD) estimates (Arkhangelsky et al. 2021), which relax the parallel trends requirement by constructing a data-driven, weighted combination of control units and pre-treatment time periods; results are consistent with the baseline. Geographic spillovers between NP and adjacent control prefectures are possible but would most likely attenuate the estimated treatment effect: if organizations founded in the NP diffuse to adjacent control prefectures, the control group's organizational density rises, narrowing the gap and biasing the NP coefficient toward zero.

2.4.2. Cardinality Matching

To adjust for the observable economic differences between the northern periphery and control prefectures, I apply cardinality matching (Zubizarreta, Paredes, and Rosenbaum 2014) on five covariates: rice dependence, economic shock (change in per-capita income, 1929–1931), per-capita income in 1931, agriculture dependence, and sharecropper rate. Cardinality matching finds the largest balanced subset of treated and control units satisfying a pre-specified SMD tolerance on all covariates simultaneously; I set this tolerance to 0.25, the threshold below which remaining bias can be reliably removed by linear regression adjustment (Imbens and Rubin 2015). The TWFE DD model is then re-estimated on this matched sample.

Figure 3 reports standardized mean differences (SMD) before and after matching. All five covariates—which together capture the major economic conditions emphasized in the existing literature on Imperial Way mobilization: the severity of the economic shock, agricultural structure, baseline wealth, agriculture dependence, and tenancy—move within the ± 0.25 threshold, yielding a balanced sample of 12 prefectures (6 of the 7 treated, 6 control).

2.5. Results

Table 1 reports the results. Right-wing organizational density in northern periphery prefectures rose by 0.20 per 100,000 population in the 12 months after May 1932 (spatial randomization inference $p < 0.001$), a gain of approximately 72 percent over the pre-treatment mean of 0.283 organizations per 100,000. The effect rises to 0.24 at 24 months and remains stable through the full prewar window. Other regions, including those with comparable downstream economic conditions, show no comparable surge. Columns 1–4 present the baseline DD estimates.

In concrete terms, a typical NP prefecture of roughly one million people had two to three grassroots right-wing organizations before the shock; the effect adds approximately



Figure 3: Matching Achieves Covariate Balance

Note: Standardized mean differences (SMD) before (gray) and after (black) cardinality matching (SMD tolerance 0.25, 12 matched prefectures), with 95% confidence intervals. Five matched covariates: rice dependence, economic shock (1929–1931), per-capita income (1931), agriculture dependence, and sharecropper rate. Light-gray band marks the ± 0.25 SMD region within which linear adjustment is considered reliable (Imbens and Rubin 2015).

two more within a year, nearly doubling the number of organizations. Across all seven NP prefectures, this translates to roughly fourteen additional organizations from a base of twenty—and because the stock measure captures persistence, this infrastructure continued to accumulate: by 36 months, the typical NP prefecture had roughly five grassroots right-wing organizations where it had previously had two to three.

Columns 5–8 assess whether these estimates survive adjustment for economic covariate imbalance via cardinality matching on the non-metropolitan sample only (12 matched prefectures). The matched specification includes the five matching covariates interacted with the post-shock indicator. The northern periphery effect is 0.20 ($p < 0.001$) at 12 months, rising to 0.23 at 24 months and 0.25 over the full prewar window. As a complementary test, Appendix C.11 reports a flow event study using new organization foundings per quarter per 100,000 as the outcome. The flow confirms the post-shock timing but with noisier pre-treatment coefficients, reflecting the sparseness of quarterly founding events; the stock measure is the preferred specification because it captures the

Outcome	Org Density (per 100k)							
	Standard DD				*Cardinality Matching DD*			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP)	0.283 [0.208]							
NP × Post	0.2029 (0.0497)*** [0.0418]***	0.2362 (0.0618)*** [0.0598]***	0.2629 (0.0950)*** [0.0978]***	0.2588 (0.1052)** [0.1097]**	0.2042 (0.0309)*** [0.0241]***	0.2310 (0.0409)*** [0.0282]***	0.2447 (0.0838)** [0.0702]***	0.2526 (0.1028)** [0.0867]***
RI 95% CI	[0.076, 0.330]	[0.072, 0.410]	[0.045, 0.461]	[0.011, 0.475]	—	—	—	—
Controls								
Metropolitan × Post	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Econ. Profile × Post	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit Statistics								
Matched prefectures	—	—	—	—	12	12	12	12
Observations	1,363	1,927	2,914	3,713	348	492	744	948
Within R^2	0.296	0.297	0.281	0.263	0.603	0.507	0.340	0.303

Table 1: Northern Periphery Mobilization Surge Is Robust to Matching

Note: Clustered (Prefecture & Month) standard errors in parentheses; Conley spatial SEs (100 km cutoff) in brackets. Columns 1–4: TWFE DD on all prefectures with Metropolitan × Post control. Columns 5–8: matching-adjusted TWFE DD on cardinality-matched non-metropolitan sample (SMD tolerance 0.25; 12 matched prefectures) with the five matching covariates × Post; Metropolitan × Post is excluded because no metropolitan prefecture enters the matched control group. RI: Randomization inference 95% CI; Fisher exact interval from 1,000 random 7-prefecture placebo groups. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.



Figure 4: Discontinuous Mobilization Surge in the Northern Periphery

Note: Points show coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from the event-study specification. Open circles with gray-shaded CIs: standard DD; black filled circles: cardinality-matched DD (matched on rice dependence, economic shock 1929–1931, per-capita income 1931, agriculture dependence, and sharecropper rate).

operative organizational infrastructure at each point in time rather than the one-time event of founding.

The event-study results in Figure 4 show no evidence of systematic pre-trends, supporting the parallel trends assumption. Organizational density in the northern periphery remains flat in the pre-period despite severe agrarian strain: rice prices had collapsed from 1930 and per-capita incomes had fallen sharply by 1931. A joint F-test for the 15 pre-treatment coefficients fails to reject the null of zero pre-trends in both the standard DD ($F(15,\cdot) = 0.456,\ p = 0.962$) and the matching DD ($F(15,\cdot) = 0.343,\ p = 0.991$); extending the pre-period to June 1929 (34 coefficients) yields even more emphatic nulls ($p = 0.990$ and $p > 0.999$).

This flatness extends specifically through the Manchurian Incident period (September 1931 onward): the more transformative *national* political shock of the early 1930s produced no differential mobilization in the northern periphery. A formal placebo test with September 1931 as the treatment date confirms this: the NP coefficient over the following eight months is 0.05 ($p = 0.125$), less than a quarter of the May 1932 effect (Appendix C.2). The Manchurian Incident was a consensus event that generated near-universal public enthusiasm across regional cleavages; the May 15 assassination was an ideologically contested act whose perpetrators explicitly framed their cause in anti-centralist agrarian terms. The differential response tracked the ideological content of the shock rather than its national severity.

The abrupt surge is specific to the northern periphery. Metropolitan areas also show positive and statistically significant TWFE coefficients (Table A.13), but the corresponding event study (Appendix C.10) reveals monotonically increasing pre-treatment trends and gradual post-shock growth without any discontinuity at the shock, indicating that the May 1932 event did not produce comparable mobilization in those prefectures.

2.6. Alternative Explanations

The NP effect could reflect economic deprivation or local connections to the perpetrators rather than peripheral identity. I consider each in turn.

To test the economic channel, I replace the northern periphery with placebo treatment groups: the top 7 non-metropolitan prefectures by each of five economic covariates and a composite of all five z-scores (Appendix B). Because NP prefectures appear in several placebo groups (3–4 out of 7), the tests are biased *in favor* of finding significant effects. All five individual placebo tests yield statistically insignificant coefficients at the +12-month window, despite this conservative overlap (Figure A.9). The 5-covariate composite is marginally significant but substantially smaller than the main NP estimate.

A perpetrator hometown placebo—assigning treatment to the home prefectures of the May 15 conspirators—likewise produces null results, ruling out the possibility that personal networks radiating from the assassins' places of origin drove the surge. Neither downstream economic conditions nor local ties to the perpetrators can reproduce the northern periphery's mobilization response.

2.7. Robustness Checks

With seven treated prefectures, cluster-robust variance estimators face known small-sample limitations (Conley and Taber 2011; Ferman and Pinto 2019). I therefore supplement cluster-robust inference with randomization inference—permuting the NP label across 1,000 random 7-prefecture groups—which does not rely on asymptotic approximations. The resulting 95% confidence intervals, reported in Table 1, exclude zero at all four post-treatment windows (Appendix C.1). Temporal placebos at May 1931 and May 1933 produce near-zero coefficients (Appendix C.2), and leave-one-out analysis confirms no single prefecture drives the result (Appendix C.3).

Alternative estimators converge on the baseline. The doubly robust DD (Sant'Anna and Zhao 2020) (ATT = 0.18, $p < 0.05$; Appendix C.6), synthetic DiD (Arkhangelsky et al. 2021) (ATT = 0.14, $p < 0.01$; Appendix C.4), and FEct (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2022) (ATT = 0.15, $p < 0.05$, placebo $p = 0.70$; Appendix C.7) all confirm a sharp post-shock surge. Extended cardinality matching with seven covariates—including tenant and landowner union density—yields an NP coefficient of 0.18 ($p < 0.01$) at the +12-month window, attenuating at longer horizons as the small matched sample limits precision (Appendix C.5). A wild cluster bootstrap (MacKinnon and Webb 2018) rejects the null at the 5% level across all four post-treatment windows (Appendix C). Replacing organization counts with total reported membership (log-transformed) as the outcome yields a coefficient of 0.99 log points ($p = 0.029$), corresponding to a 170% increase in membership density, which strengthens to 1.26 log points ($p < 0.001$) after cardinality matching (Appendix C.9). Appendix C.8 reports sensitivity analysis under the (Rambachan and Roth 2023) framework for honest confidence intervals. With 7 treated clusters, the framework treats nearly any deviation from a perfectly linear pre-trend as compatible with a zero post-shock effect, regardless of how flat the observed pre-period is; the breakdown value is zero for this reason rather than because the data are uninformative. The identification rests instead on three pieces of evidence that do not depend on this framework: flat pre-trends during two years of severe depression, the FEct out-of-sample equivalence test ($p = 0.70$; Appendix C.7), and the randomization inference confidence intervals reported in Table 1.

2.8. Imperial Way Compositional Shift

The post-shock organizational surge was ideologically specific, not just larger: the region became dominated by organizations whose charters called for ending parliamentary governance—party dissolution, direct imperial rule, *Shōwa Restoration*, state reconstruction —the program historians identify with Imperial Way (*Kōdōha*) doctrine. The classification captures this ideological content rather than factional subordination to the Kōdōha officer clique. The Kōdōha–Tōseiha boundary was more fluid than the labels suggest, and the young officers' movement was driven partly by academy-class cohorts and career resentment, not solely by ideological adherence to a coherent faction (Kitaoka 2021, pp. 180–181). What matters for democratic erosion is that these organizations' founding charters called for ending parliamentary governance, regardless of their precise relationship to the military faction—the same program that the February 26 rebels invoked (Kitaoka 2021; Shillony 1973).

Maintaining the restriction to grassroots organizations, I classify each organization's *rhetorical alignment with radical autocratic goals* using keywords from its stated purpose, background, or ideology: *kōdō* (Imperial Way), *Shōwa ishin* (Shōwa Restoration), *seitō*



Figure 5: The Peripheral Surge Was Disproportionately Imperial Way

Note: (a) Imperial Way share of newly founded grassroots right-wing organizations (lines, left axis); bars (right axis) show total new organizations by region. (b) IW-minus-non-IW founding gap (mean per prefecture), which is the quantity that identifies the DDD. Lines show four-quarter centered moving averages; Figure A.24 in the appendix plots panel (b) at raw quarterly frequency matching the regression data. Solid: northern periphery; dashed: all other prefectures. Dashed vertical line marks May 15, 1932.

kaishō (party dissolution), *tennō shinsei* (direct imperial rule), and *kokka kaizō* (state reconstruction).

Figure 5 shows the compositional shift. Panel (a): before the shock, the northern periphery's Imperial Way share was below 10%, well under the roughly 15% baseline elsewhere. After May 1932, the share rose to 30–40%, overtaking the rest of the country. The northern periphery did not simply gain more right-wing organizations; it gained a different organizational composition. Panel (b) plots the IW-minus-non-IW founding gap, which is the quantity that identifies the DDD. Before the shock, the gap trends in parallel across the northern periphery and other prefectures; after the shock, the northern periphery's gap rises sharply.

2.8.1. Triple-Difference Design

The DDD tests whether the post-shock organizational surge in the northern periphery concentrated disproportionately among Imperial Way organizations, using non-Imperial Way organizations within the same prefecture as an internal comparison group (Gruber 1994). The outcome is the count of newly founded organizations (flow) at the prefecture-quarter-type level.[5]

$$\text{NewOrgs}_{p,t,k} = \beta_1(\text{NP}_p \times \text{Post}_t \times \text{IW}_k) + \beta_2(\text{NP}_p \times \text{Post}_t) + \beta_3(\text{Post}_t \times \text{IW}_k) + \alpha_{p,k} + \gamma_{t,k} + \varepsilon_{p,t,k}$$

where $\text{NewOrgs}_{p,t,k}$ is the count of organizations of type $k \in \{0,1\}$ founded in prefecture p during quarter t; IW_k indicates Imperial Way type; $\alpha_{p,k}$ are prefecture-by-type fixed effects absorbing time-invariant differences in the baseline level of each type across prefectures; and $\gamma_{t,k}$ are quarter-by-type fixed effects absorbing national trends in each type. The coefficient β_1 captures whether the NP post-shock surge concentrated disproportionately among Imperial Way organizations.

The identifying assumption is that the *gap* between Imperial Way and non-Imperial Way founding rates would have trended in parallel across NP and non-NP prefectures absent the shock. This requirement is weaker than the standard DD assumption: NP and non-NP prefectures may differ in both IW and non-IW levels and trends, so long as the differential between the two types trends in parallel. A linear pre-trend test on the event-study DDD coefficients yields a slope of 0.0005 ($p = 0.886$): no differential pre-trend. Because any factor that affects both types equally—economic conditions, mobilization capacity, administrative capacity for registration—is differenced out by the within-prefecture type comparison, the specification requires neither economic controls nor population normalization. Standard errors are two-way clustered by prefecture and quarter.

2.8.2. DDD Results

Table 2 reports the DDD results. The coefficient (β_1) is positive and significant from the +24-month horizon onward, confirming that the post-shock surge concentrated

[5]The DDD asks whether *newly created* organizations were disproportionately Imperial Way—a question about the composition of the flow, not the stock. Ideology is classified at founding from the organization's stated purpose, so the stock measure would dilute the post-shock compositional shift with pre-existing organizations whose type was determined years earlier; Appendix G confirms the result holds, attenuated, with the stock measure. The flow of new foundings is in turn sparse—the pre-treatment NP mean is 0.011 Imperial Way organizations per prefecture-quarter, essentially all zeros—so monthly frequency would leave insufficient variation for the three-way interaction. Quarterly aggregation is the minimal temporal coarsening that yields enough non-zero cells while retaining the resolution to distinguish pre- and post-shock periods.

Outcome	NewOrgs (prefecture × quarter × type)			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Window:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP, IW)	0.011 [0.105]			
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP, non-IW)	0.203 [0.601]			
NP × Post × IW	0.485*	0.638**	0.617***	0.483***
	(0.280)	(0.255)	(0.217)	(0.163)
NP × Post	−0.484	−0.573*	−0.571**	−0.435**
	(0.349)	(0.309)	(0.278)	(0.194)
Controls				
Prefecture × Type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter × Type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit Statistics				
Observations	2,820	3,196	3,572	4,418
R^2	0.530	0.551	0.574	0.585
Within R^2	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.005

Table 2: DDD: NP Surge Is Disproportionately Imperial Way

Note: Unit of analysis: prefecture × quarter × organization type (Imperial Way or non-Imperial Way). Outcome: NewOrgs, count of newly founded grassroots right-wing organizations. β_1: DDD coefficient (NP × Post × Imperial Way type). β_2: NP × Post effect on non-Imperial Way organizations (base category). Clustered (prefecture & quarter) standard errors in parentheses. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

disproportionately among Imperial Way organizations. Before the shock, NP prefectures averaged 0.011 Imperial Way organizations founded per quarter—essentially all zeros—so the DDD captures an extensive-margin shift from nonexistence to regular presence.[6] The prewar estimate of 0.48 implies that the shock increased Imperial Way founding in NP by roughly 0.48 organizations per prefecture-quarter relative to the change in non-Imperial Way founding. The base effect ($\beta_2 = -0.44$) shows that non-Imperial Way founding in NP declined relative to other prefectures, even as total organizational density increased sharply. This is consistent with Imperial Way ideology absorbing organizational energy that might otherwise have produced generic nationalist groups: the shock redirected the region's organizational impulse toward the radical program.

Where virtually no Imperial Way organizations had existed, they now predominated. This compositional shift is a direct measure of democratic erosion: the Imperial Way

[6]In raw counts: 4 Imperial Way organizations were founded in NP prefectures before May 1932, compared to 26 after (through July 1937). The Imperial Way share of all grassroots foundings in the NP rose from 9.8% to 27.1%, while the corresponding share in non-NP, non-metropolitan prefectures rose more modestly from 5.4% to 14.3%.

keywords (party dissolution, direct imperial rule, Shōwa Restoration, state reconstruction) constitute the core demands of the movement that staged the February 26 coup. What the northern periphery gained was organizations whose founding charters called for ending parliamentary governance.

Randomization inference confirms the result: one-sided $p = 0.030$ at +24 months, strengthening to $p < 0.001$ at the prewar endpoint (Appendix H). Whether these organizations were deliberately planted by Kōdōha officers or spontaneously adopted the faction's rhetoric cannot be determined from the keyword data alone. Both pathways are consistent with the bypass mechanism: even planted organizations operated as civic associations outside the military hierarchy. The subgroup analysis favors the grassroots interpretation—prefectures outside the 8th Division's jurisdiction also show positive effects—but distinguishing the two pathways definitively would require organizational-level evidence on founders' identities. Excluding the most ambiguous keyword (*kokka kaizō*) leaves the DDD estimates virtually unchanged (Appendix F).[7]

2.9. Beyond Ideology Propagation

Post-shock NP organizations were active vehicles for the conspiracy network. The registry (Nagata 2014) records named coup-plot figures and prefigurative imperial-rule-assistance (*yokusan*) rhetoric in NP organizations through the mid-1930s. Kōdō Ishinjuku (Wakamatsu, Fukushima 1935), founded at the Aizu residence of Shibukawa Zensuke, the only civilian executed for the February 26 coup, is the canonical case: five of its ten named members were implicated in the February 26 conspiracy (Shibukawa tried and executed; four others investigated as suspects, Table A.26), and police forcibly closed the academy in March 1936, days after the failed coup. Similar NP academies founded after May 1932 deployed the imperial-rule-assistance idiom in their founding statutes years before the national Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) appropriated the term in October

[7] I validate the keyword set using a chi-squared keyness analysis and leave-one-out cross-validation: removing each keyword from the classification and testing whether it remains statistically over-represented among organizations identified by the remaining keywords. All retained keywords pass this test, confirming internal coherence. The classification is conservative: organizations with nationalist but non-radical-autocratic orientations (e.g., veterans' associations, shrine-based groups) are coded as non-Imperial Way.

1940. This infrastructure persisted as a parallel ideological-mobilizational layer outside the IRAA structure that absorbed civic associations in the late 1930s (Kasza 1995, ch. 3), supplying personnel to the very regime that had structurally marginalized its claim to leadership (Hardacre 2022).

3. Organizing Violence Production

3.1. Tests at Two Levels

Section 2 documented prefecture-level mobilization; this section asks whether the same network ties channeled participation in violence itself. The outcome to be explained is participation in 22 dated political-violence events between 1928 and 1943: rightist assassinations, coup attempts, and group attacks compiled from court records and biographical sources (Chūseidō 1934; Shillony 1973; Kitaoka 2021), with named participants and roles listed in Appendix P. The 15 named civilian ideologues are the principal interwar agrarian-nationalist and statist-restoration figures (Kita Ikki, Ōkawa Shūmei, Inoue Nisshō, and twelve others), identified in Appendix O. I test the network mechanism at two levels. An org-level cross-section finds that past-perpetrator co-membership is the dominant correlate of violence supply (IRR ≈ 9), exceeding ideologue presence and the Imperial Way keyword. A person-month panel finds that sharing an active organization with a prior perpetrator quadruples the within-person hazard of crossing into violence.

3.2. Org-Level Cross-Section

The sample is 2,102 right-wing organizations founded by February 1936 with a recorded founding date (2,043 of the 4,145 registered orgs are dropped for missing founding dates).[8] The outcome n_j counts distinct members of org j who appear as participants in any of the 22 dated violence events; mean $n_j = 0.13$, max $= 18$, and 165 orgs (7.85%) supply at least one participant. Predictors are time-invariant org features: HasIdeologue_j (contains ≥ 1 of the 15 named civilian ideologues), HasPastPerpTie_j (shares ≥ 1 member with

[8] An org-month panel TWFE on the same data returns null because org fixed effects absorb every time-invariant attribute and rare events ($Y = 1$ in 0.225% of org-months) leave little within-org variation; the cross-section recovers the contribution of those features that the panel could not.

another org that ever supplied a violence participant), IsIW_j (Imperial Way keyword), IsNPOrg_j (NP-headquartered), HasMilitary_j, log org size, and a pre-shock founding indicator. The main specification is a negative binomial regression with prefecture fixed effects and standard errors clustered on prefecture:

$$\log E\left[n_j \mid X_j, \alpha_{p(j)}\right] = \alpha_{p(j)} + \beta_1 \text{HasIdeologue}_j + \beta_2 \text{HasPastPerpTie}_j \\ + \beta_3 \text{IsIW}_j + \beta_4 \text{HasMilitary}_j + \beta_5 \log\left(1 + \text{Size}_j\right) + \beta_6 \text{PreShock}_j,$$

where $\alpha_{p(j)}$ is a prefecture fixed effect for org j's headquarters prefecture $p(j)$. A linear probability specification on the binary AnyViolence_j is reported alongside.

Four features carry large, statistically distinguishable associations with violence supply. Past-perpetrator co-membership is the largest single predictor (IRR = 8.92, $p < 0.001$): orgs sharing a member with another violence-supplying org are nearly nine times as likely to supply a participant themselves. Ideologue presence (IRR = 7.16, $p < 0.001$) and military membership (IRR = 2.81, $p < 0.001$) follow. The Imperial Way keyword carries the smallest of the four estimated effects (IRR = 2.26, $p < 0.001$), consistent with the paper's broader claim that the network—not the doctrinal label—predicts who supplies violence. Org size and pre/post-shock founding are null. The LPM mirrors the pattern: $\beta_{\text{HasIdeologue}} = 0.357$, $\beta_{\text{HasPastPerpTie}} = 0.090$, $\beta_{\text{HasMilitary}} = 0.124$, $\beta_{\text{IsIW}} = 0.036$, all $p < 0.001$. Dropping the 144 orgs that contain a named ideologue—so the past-perpetrator-tie coefficient is identified entirely off the rank-and-file network—preserves the headline at IRR = 8.23 ($p < 0.001$): the contagion-tie effect is not driven by the ideologues themselves.

The cross-section identifies which features correlate with violence supply, conditional on prefecture. It does not distinguish causation from selection: orgs containing past-perpetrator ties may already differ from orgs that do not in unobserved ways correlated with violence supply. The merit of the design is what it recovers that the panel cannot. Time-invariant attributes that the org-month TWFE absorbed—Imperial Way, military, ideologue presence—become identifiable here, and the past-perpetrator-tie variable now reads as the dominant org-level correlate rather than as a null. The contagion-tie variable is the robust headline; the Imperial Way keyword has the smallest estimated effect of the



Figure 6: Org-Level Cross-Section: Four Time-Invariant Features Predict Violence Supply

Note: Negative binomial IRRs (and 95% CIs from prefecture-clustered SEs) from a cross-section of 2,102 right-wing orgs founded by February 1936; outcome is the count of distinct members appearing as violence participants. Specification includes prefecture fixed effects. Past-perpetrator co-membership (IRR = 8.92), ideologue presence (IRR = 7.16), military membership (IRR = 2.81), and Imperial Way keyword (IRR = 2.26) all $p < 0.001$; size and pre-shock founding are null. The drop-ideologue robustness preserves the past-perpetrator tie at IRR = 8.23 ($p < 0.001$).

four, consistent with the substantive claim that the structural-network position, not the ideological label, carries the violence-supply signal. The IsNPOrg coefficient is degenerate (perfect separation): NP HQs concentrate in NP prefectures and the indicator is absorbed by prefecture fixed effects; this is a design limitation, not an absence of effect.

3.3. Person-Month Panel

I construct a person-month panel of 12,404 right-wing organization members observed from the earliest org foundation through February 1936, right-censored at first violence participation, yielding 701,530 person-months. The outcome Y_{it} equals one if person i first participates in violence in month t (mean $Y = 1.33 \times 10^{-4}$, 93 first-violence events). Two natively time-varying treatments enter the specification: TiePastPerp_{it} equals one if person i shares at least one active org with someone who has already participated in violence by $t-1$; TieIdeologue_{it} equals one if person i shares at least one active org with one of the 15 named civilian ideologues at month t. Both vary within person because new orgs are founded and join the person's active set over time, and because other persons cross into violence as events accumulate.[9] The specification is

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \tau_{y(t)} + \beta_1 \cdot \text{TiePastPerp}_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{TieIdeologue}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $\tau_{y(t)}$ is a year fixed effect and standard errors are two-way clustered on person and year.

The past-perpetrator-tie coefficient is $\hat{\beta}_1 = 5.61 \times 10^{-4}$ (SE 2.01×10^{-4}, $p = 0.023$): about four times the unconditional monthly rate of 1.33×10^{-4}, statistically significant. The ideologue-tie coefficient is $\hat{\beta}_2 = 1.23 \times 10^{-3}$ (SE 7.27×10^{-4}, $p = 0.128$): the point estimate is roughly nine times the unconditional rate but no longer reaches conventional significance. The load-bearing predictor is prior-perpetrator co-membership: persons who share an active organization with someone who has already crossed into violence become measurably more likely to cross themselves, conditional on person and year fixed effects. [10]



Figure 7: Person-Month Panel: Past-Perpetrator-Tie and Ideologue-Tie Coefficients

Note: TWFE coefficients on TiePastPerp_{it} and TieIdeologue_{it} from the person-month panel (1928-01–1936-02; $N = 701,530$ person-months across 12,404 persons; right-censored at first violence) under year FE. Bars are 95% confidence intervals from two-way clustered standard errors (person, year). The past-perpetrator-tie effect ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 5.61 \times 10^{-4}$, $p = 0.023$) is about four times the unconditional monthly rate. Time-invariant person attributes (military status, NP linkage, Imperial Way membership) are absorbed by person FE.

[9] Within-unit variation: TiePastPerp_{it} varies in 2,414 of 12,404 persons ($\approx$ 20%); TieIdeologue_{it} varies in 467 of 12,404 ($\approx$ 3.8%). Identifying variation comes from these subsets.

[10] With only nine year clusters in the second cluster dimension, asymptotic two-way cluster SE formulas are on thin ice. A wild cluster bootstrap would tighten inference; the substantive direction and magnitude survive that check qualitatively, but the precise p-value is sensitive to the asymptotic formula.

The effect is not driven by the ideologues themselves. Dropping the 15 named ideologues from the panel—so that the past-perpetrator-tie coefficient is identified entirely off non-ideologue rank-and-file persons—preserves the result: $\hat{\beta}_{\text{TiePastPerp}} = 4.43 \times 10^{-4}$ ($p = 0.037$). The ideologue-tie coefficient retains a comparable point estimate (9.81×10^{-4}) but $p = 0.110$. Restricting to civilians (dropping military persons) shrinks the sample, and the past-perpetrator tie is at the edge of conventional significance ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 4.14 \times 10^{-4}$, $p = 0.083$); the point estimate matches the full-sample direction, consistent with the rank-and-file civic-organizational network rather than the army hierarchy carrying the contagion signal. Pre- and post-shock subsample splits are null at $p > 0.40$ on both ties, reflecting the loss of power once the panel is bisected; the substantive direction in the post-shock split is preserved on TiePastPerp.

The two designs read together return one finding at different units. The org cross-section identifies which org features correlate with violence supply: past-perpetrator co-membership dominates (IRR ≈ 9), ideologue presence and military membership add independent contributions, and the Imperial Way keyword carries the smallest of the four estimated effects. The person panel identifies the time-varying within-person mechanism: sharing an active organization with someone who has already crossed into violence raises the monthly hazard by roughly a factor of four, robust to dropping the named ideologues, and concentrated in the civilian rank and file rather than the military layer. Both designs recover the same substantive object—organizational contagion through past-perpetrator co-membership—and locate the load-bearing variable in the structural network rather than in any doctrinal label or named broker. This completes the picture begun with Section 2′s prefecture-level Imperial Way surge: peripheral mobilization built the organizational base, and rank-and-file participation propagated through the resulting peer ties. The Wakamatsu Kōdō Ishinjuku academy is exactly the kind of high-multiplier organization the network-wide IRR ≈ 9 estimate is averaging over: a single post-shock NP academy with 10 named members, 5 of whom were implicated in the February 26 conspiracy.

4. Conclusion

Formal institutional gatekeeping monitors two channels: party exclusion of radicals and military containment of unauthorized seizure. Japan's interwar collapse shows that civic organizations can circumvent both. Radicals locked out of both institutions built organizations in the northern periphery that propagated anti-democratic ideology, produced violence participants, and furnished prominent personnel to the pre-coup conspiracy network, constructing the organizational base for the February 1936 coup. That peripheral status—not economic hardship—determined where this infrastructure took root distinguishes the mechanism from grievance-driven accounts: depression-era suffering was national, but the organizational response concentrated where historical exclusion from the governing coalition made anti-centralist nationalism resonate. The May 1932 assassination activated this latent identity where two years of severe depression had not. Once built, the organizational infrastructure exhibited persistence (Hannan and Freeman 1993), intensifying through the end of the prewar period (Figure 4). Institutional gatekeeping monitors who enters; democratic resilience also requires monitoring what is built outside.

The mechanism operates at two grains. The Imperial Way organizational infrastructure was durable: it generated violence participants for a decade and survived the February 26 purge of the officer clique. Within that infrastructure, the person-level fingerprint is rank-and-file contagion through co-membership: sharing an active organization with someone who has already participated in violence raises a person's monthly probability of crossing into violence by roughly a factor of four. The organizational base outlived the conspiracy; purging conspirators did not dismantle the civic network through which participation propagated.

The bypass mechanism takes different forms. Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael built grassroots infrastructure in rural communities where the state's reach was incomplete (Cârstocea 2017), organizational rooting outside functioning institutions, as in Japan. Hungary's Fidesz captured civic associations from within the party system, converting associational life into a partisan resource (Jakli, Greskovits, and Wittenberg 2025), organizational colonization from inside. Civic organizations served as the vehicle in each, through opposite mechanisms. The common thread is that civic organizations can supply a pathway to democratic erosion (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023) that institutional gatekeeping alone cannot prevent. Where durable exclusion from the governing coalition has produced anti-centralist grievance, radical entrepreneurs can activate latent identity when a politically framed event matches the community's self-understanding. The window for institutional response is narrow.

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Appendix

Contents

A. Descriptive Statistics

		Full Sample				*Group Means*		
	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	NP	Other	Metro
Panel A: Outcome								
Org. density (per 100k)	47	0.051	0.068	0.000	0.435	0.029	0.038	0.151
Panel B: Covariates								
Rice share of GVA	47	0.160	0.077	0.005	0.328	0.237	0.164	0.049
Economic shock (p.c.)	47	−0.004	0.003	−0.019	0.003	−0.004	−0.004	−0.005
Sharecropper rate	47	0.460	0.115	0.136	0.699	0.537	0.439	0.489
Per-capita income 1931	47	0.040	0.036	0.007	0.208	0.024	0.030	0.116
Agriculture dependence	47	0.289	0.098	0.035	0.446	0.379	0.303	0.104
Tenant union rate	47	0.200	0.180	0.000	0.893	0.146	0.214	0.182
Owner union rate	47	0.281	0.767	0.000	3.491	0.024	0.066	1.797
Population density	47	199.7	200.0	14.8	1,086	83.5	161.9	549.8
Road density (km/km^2)	47	3.50	2.22	0.48	10.8	1.76	3.52	5.40

Table A.3: NP Prefectures Are More Rural and Less Organized Before Treatment

Note: Prefecture-level pre-treatment statistics for all 47 prefectures. N is the count of prefectures with non-missing values; no variable has missing observations. Outcome averaged over pre-treatment months (Jan 1931–Apr 1932). Group means: NP = northern periphery ($N = 7$); Other = non-metropolitan, non-NP ($N = 34$); Metro = metropolitan ($N = 6$). Economic shock: mean per-capita income change 1929–1931 (thousands of yen). Per-capita income 1931 in thousands of yen. Rice share: rice production value divided by gross prefectural product (1925). Tenant household share and union organization rates at 1932. Road density in km per km^2 (1932). *Sources:* Right-wing organizations from Nagata (2014); rice share and agriculture dependence from Hitotsubashi GPP Database and MAFF Statistics; all other variables from the Imperial Statistical Yearbook (*Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan*).

B. Placebo Tests

Figure A.8 shows the two placebo prefecture groups. For each economic covariate, I rank non-metropolitan prefectures and select the top 7 as a placebo treatment group, matching the NP size; a 5-covariate composite ranks by the sum of all z-scores. The perpetrator hometown group collects the home prefectures of the May 15 conspirators.



(a) 5-Cov Composite Placebo

(b) Perpetrator Hometown

Figure A.8: Placebo Prefecture Groups

Note: (a) Top 7 non-metropolitan prefectures by composite z-score (rice dependence + economic shock + income + agriculture dependence + sharecropper rate): Akita, Ibaraki, Yamagata, Chiba, Toyama, Niigata, Tottori (4 overlap with NP). (b) Perpetrator hometown prefectures: Saga, Nagasaki, Niigata, Aomori, Oita, Ehime, Kumamoto, Ibaraki, Yamagata, Tokyo (3 overlap with NP).

Figure A.9 reports the placebo coefficient estimates. All individual and composite placebo tests yield statistically insignificant or substantially smaller coefficients than the NP main effect, despite the conservative overlap with NP prefectures.



Figure A.9: Neither Economic Conditions nor Perpetrator Proximity Predict Mobilization

Note: Shown are point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the placebo × post coefficient at the +12-month window. Each individual placebo selects the top seven non-metropolitan prefectures (including any overlap with NP prefectures) for a given covariate; the 5-covariate composite ranks prefectures by the sum of all five z-scores. Because NP prefectures may enter both placebo groups and the main estimation, the test is biased toward detecting spurious effects. For comparison, the NP main effect is also displayed. All models include prefecture and month fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by prefecture and month.

C. Robustness

Each robustness check is detailed in the subsections below, with figures presented in their respective sections.

C.1. Spatial Placebo

Statistic	Value	Details
True N. Periphery effect	0.2029	Post × Treated coefficient (+12m)
Baseline placebo (random)		
Placebo p-value	0.000	Two-sided; 1,000 simulations
Matched placebo (rice dependence + econ. shock)		
Matched p-value	0.000	Two-sided; 1,000 matched groups

Table A.4: True Effect Lies Far in the Tail of the Placebo Distribution

Note: The placebo distribution uses the +12-month post window with metropolitan × post control. Baseline placebo uses random 7-prefecture treated groups excluding metropolitan prefectures; matched placebo restricts to the closest groups on rice-dependence and economic-shock moments.



Figure A.10: Spatial Placebo Distribution

Note: Placebo DD estimates from 1,000 randomly selected 7-prefecture treated groups (excluding metropolitan prefectures). The true NP estimate (vertical line) lies far in the tail of the distribution ($p < 0.001$).

C.2. Temporal Placebo

Table A.5 reports the temporal placebo test. I shift the treatment date one year earlier (May 1931) and one year later (May 1933), re-estimating the DD within symmetric ± 12-month windows around each placebo date. Both placebo coefficients are substantially smaller than the true May 1932 effect, confirming that the mobilization effect is specific to the May 1932 shock. Figure A.11 shows the corresponding event studies: the May 1931 placebo exhibits no clear break, while the May 1933 placebo shows a flat trajectory around the placebo date.

Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment Date:	May 1931 (placebo)	May 1932 (true)	May 1933 (placebo)
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP)		0.283 [0.208]	
Northern Periphery × Post	0.0500 (0.0325)	0.1927*** (0.0441)	0.0595 (0.0491)
Controls			
Metropolitan × Post	Yes	Yes	Yes
Econ. Profile × Post	No	No	No
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit Statistics			
Observations	1,128	1,128	1,128
R^2	0.984	0.969	0.976
Within R^2	0.141	0.293	0.215

Table A.5: Effect Is Specific to May 1932

Note: Shifting the treatment date to May 1931 or May 1933 yields coefficients substantially smaller than the true May 1932 effect. Each column estimates a DD with the indicated treatment date and a symmetric ±12-month window. All models include metropolitan × post control. Clustered (Prefecture & Month) standard errors in parentheses. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.



(a) May 1931 (placebo)

(b) May 1933 (placebo)

Figure A.11: Temporal Placebo Event Studies Show No Discontinuity

Note: Event studies for placebo treatment dates. Panel (a): May 1931 (±12-month window). Panel (b): May 1933 (±12-month window). Neither placebo exhibits the sharp post-treatment surge observed at the true May 1932 date (Figure 4).

As a further check, I re-estimate the DD using September 1931 (the Manchurian Incident) as the treatment date, with a +8-month post-window ending in April 1932—the last month before the actual May 15 shock. The NP coefficient is 0.050 ($p = 0.125$), less than a quarter of the May 1932 effect (0.203) and not statistically significant, confirming that the Manchurian Incident—a consensus event generating near-universal enthusiasm rather than factionally specific mobilization—did not produce a differential organizational surge in the periphery.

C.3. Leave-One-Out

Excluded Prefecture	N	Coefficient	SE
Aomori	1,334	0.1765***	(0.0475)
Iwate	1,334	0.2115***	(0.0552)
Miyagi	1,334	0.2256***	(0.0495)
Akita	1,334	0.1892***	(0.0535)
Yamagata	1,334	0.2053***	(0.0551)
Fukushima	1,334	0.1855***	(0.0529)
Niigata	1,334	0.2265***	(0.0496)

Table A.6: No Single Prefecture Drives the Result

Note: Common pre-period (1931-01-01 to 1932-05-15) and +12-month post window. SE column reports clustered (Prefecture & Month) standard errors. Each row re-estimates the DD with one northern periphery prefecture omitted.



Figure A.12: Leave-One-Out Coefficient Estimates

Note: Post × Treated coefficient (with 95% CIs) from DD models that omit one northern periphery prefecture at a time. No single prefecture drives the result.

C.4. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences

Synthetic difference-in-differences (SDD) (Arkhangelsky et al. 2021) relaxes the parallel-trends assumption by constructing weighted controls and time periods to match the northern periphery's pre-shock path. The donor pool comprises 34 non-metropolitan prefectures. With a +12m post window, the SDD ATT is 0.140 (SE = 0.053, $p < 0.01$), consistent with the baseline DD estimate (0.203, Table 1).



(a) Treated vs. Synthetic (SDD)



(b) Gap (Treated − Synthetic)

Figure A.13: Synthetic DD Confirms the Post-Shock Peripheral Surge

Note: Panel (a): solid line shows the mean organizational density across the 7 northern periphery prefectures; dashed line shows the SDD-weighted synthetic control (intercept-adjusted). Panel (b): the gap between treated and synthetic over time. Dashed vertical line marks May 15, 1932.

Table A.7 reports the SDD ATT across post-treatment windows.

Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP)		0.283 [0.208]		
N. Periphery ATT	0.1404***	0.1673***	0.1895*	0.1801*
	(0.0488)	(0.0673)	(0.1062)	(0.1047)
Fit Statistics				
Treated prefectures	7	7	7	7
Control prefectures	34	34	34	34
Pre-treatment periods	36	36	36	36
Post-treatment periods	12	24	45	62
Observations	1,968	2,460	3,444	4,018

Table A.7: Synthetic DD Confirms the Post-Shock Effect

Note: SDD ATT across post-treatment windows. Pre-treatment period: June 1929 to May 1932. SDD estimates from the synthdid package (Arkhangelsky et al. 2021). 7 treated (northern periphery) and 34 non-metropolitan control prefectures. Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

C.5. Seven-Covariate Cardinality Matching

Table A.8 reports matching-adjusted DD estimates from cardinality matching on all seven economic covariates (SMD tolerance 0.35), with economic profile covariates interacted with Post. The tolerance is relaxed from 0.25 (used for the five-covariate specification) because seven-dimensional matching on 41 prefectures is more constrained; at 0.35 all seven treated prefectures are retained (versus six at 0.25). The northern periphery coefficient (0.179 at +12 months, $p < 0.01$) tracks the baseline closely. Figure A.14 shows covariate balance before and after matching; every covariate falls within the ± 0.35 SMD band.



Figure A.14: Seven-Covariate Cardinality Matching Balance

Note: Standardized mean differences before (gray) and after (black) cardinality matching on all seven covariates. Light-gray band marks the ± 0.35 SMD tolerance region.

	7-Cov Cardinality DD			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP)	0.283 [0.208]			
N. Periphery × Post	0.1789***	0.1604**	0.1096	0.0852
	(0.0439)	(0.0581)	(0.0723)	(0.0821)
Controls				
Econ. Profile × Post	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit Statistics				
Matched prefectures	14	14	14	14
Observations	406	574	868	1,106

Table A.8: NP Effect Is Robust to Seven-Covariate Cardinality Matching

Note: Matching-adjusted TWFE DD on cardinality-matched sample (all 7 covariates balanced within ±0.35 SMD; 14 matched prefectures—all 7 treated, 7 controls) with economic profile covariates × Post controls. The tolerance is relaxed from 0.25 to 0.35 to retain all treated prefectures; residual imbalance is absorbed by the doubly robust covariate × Post controls. Sample restricted to matched prefectures (metropolitan areas excluded). Prefecture and month fixed effects; clustered (Prefecture & Month) standard errors. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

C.6. Doubly Robust Difference-in-Differences

Table A.9 reports ATT estimates from the doubly robust DD estimator of (Sant'Anna and Zhao 2020), which combines inverse probability weighting with outcome regression. The estimator is consistent if either the propensity score model or the outcome regression model is correctly specified, providing a stronger robustness guarantee than approaches that rely on a single modeling strategy. Covariates are the same five used in the cardinality matching: rice dependence, economic shock (1929–1931), per-capita income (1931), agriculture dependence, and sharecropper rate. The sample is restricted to non-metropolitan prefectures (7 treated, 34 control), with the monthly panel collapsed to pre- and post-period means for each window.

The DR-DD ATT is 0.18 at +12 months ($p < 0.05$) and 0.20 at +24 months ($p < 0.05$), consistent with the baseline DD (0.20 and 0.24) and other covariate-adjusted estimators. Precision declines at longer horizons, reflecting the small treated group.



Figure A.15: Doubly Robust DD Event Study

Note: Doubly robust DD event study (Sant'Anna and Zhao 2020) with flat pre-trends and a sharp post-shock divergence, consistent with the baseline.

Outcome	Org Density (per 100k)			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP)	0.283 [0.208]			
Northern Periphery ATT	0.1814** (0.0718)	0.1992** (0.0897)	0.1712 (0.1213)	0.1476 (0.1332)
Fit Statistics				
Treated prefectures	7	7	7	7
Control prefectures	34	34	34	34
Pref. × month obs.	1,189	1,681	3,280	3,239

Table A.9: Doubly Robust DD Confirms the Peripheral Surge

Note: Improved doubly robust DD (panel) estimator (Sant'Anna and Zhao 2020). The monthly panel is collapsed to pre- and post-period means for each window; the estimator differences out unit-level time-invariant confounders and uses five economic covariates (rice dependence, economic shock 1929–1931, per-capita income 1931, agriculture dependence, sharecropper rate) in both the inverse probability weighting and outcome regression models. Standard errors in parentheses. Non-metropolitan prefectures only. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

C.7. FE Counterfactual Estimator

The fixed effects counterfactual (FEct) estimator (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2022) addresses two limitations of the standard TWFE event study. First, it avoids the negative-weights problem by fitting the two-way FE model only on untreated observations and imputing counterfactual outcomes for treated units. Second, its dynamic treatment effects plot is based on residuals ($Y_{it} - \hat{Y}_{it}(0)$) rather than interaction coefficients, relaxing the constant-treatment-effect assumption implicit in the conventional event-study specification.

Figure A.16 shows the estimated period-specific ATTs with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (200 iterations). Pre-treatment residuals are flat and centered on zero, consistent with parallel trends. The treatment effect emerges at the onset of the shock and stabilizes around 0.15–0.19 per 100,000 population, tracking the baseline DD. The overall ATT across the +24-month post-treatment window is 0.15 (SE $= 0.07$, $p < 0.05$).

Figure A.17 reports the equivalence test for no pretrend (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2022). The test hides pre-treatment periods sequentially and checks whether out-of-sample prediction errors fall within a pre-specified equivalence range ($\pm 0.36\hat{\sigma}_{\varepsilon}$). The placebo test cannot reject the null of zero pre-treatment effect ($p = 0.70$), providing out-of-sample—and thus overfitting-immune—support for the identifying assumptions.



Figure A.16: FEct Dynamic Treatment Effects

Note: Period-specific ATT estimates from the FE counterfactual estimator (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2022). Points: residual-based ATT ($Y_{it} - \hat{Y}_{it}(0)$) averaged across treated units at each relative time period. Shaded region: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (200 iterations). Bar plot at bottom: number of treated units. Placebo periods (blue) are hidden from model fitting and predicted out of sample.



Figure A.17: FEct Equivalence Test Supports No Pretrend

Note: Leave-one-period-out pre-treatment prediction errors with 90% bootstrap confidence intervals. Red dashed lines: equivalence range ($\pm 0.36\hat{\sigma}_{\varepsilon}$). Gray dashed lines: minimum range. Pre-treatment errors fall within the equivalence bounds, consistent with valid identifying assumptions. Placebo t-test $p = 0.70$; equivalence (TOST) $p = 0.12$.

Outcome	Org Density (per 100k)			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
FEct ATT	0.1442***	0.1511**	0.1460	0.1269
	(0.0553)	(0.0709)	(0.1048)	(0.1161)
95% CI	[0.036, 0.253]	[0.012, 0.290]	[–0.059, 0.352]	[–0.101, 0.355]
Placebo equiv. p		0.70		
Observations	1,363	1,927	2,914	3,713
Treated cells	91	175	322	441

Table A.10: FE Counterfactual Estimator Across Post-Treatment Windows

Note: FEct ATT estimates (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2022) with 200 bootstrap iterations. FEct imputes $Y(0)$ for treated observations using a TWFE model fitted only on untreated observations. The ATT averages over all post-treatment periods in each window, so estimates are mechanically smaller than the DD coefficient (which captures the average post-treatment level shift). Placebo equivalence p-value from the leave-periods-out test on the +24m specification. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

C.8. Sensitivity to Parallel Trends Violations

Rambachan and Roth (2023) propose honest confidence intervals that remain valid under calibrated violations of parallel trends. I implement their relative magnitudes (RM) framework using the `HonestDiD` R package.

Under the RM approach, the breakdown value is $\overline{M} = 0$: the treatment effect loses significance at the smallest allowable post-treatment violation. The driver is the ratio between the maximum pre-treatment coefficient and the conventional CI's distance from zero. The conventional CI for the average post-treatment effect (at $\overline{M} = 0$) is $[0.114, 0.200]$; the maximum absolute pre-treatment coefficient is 0.089—78% of the lower bound. Allowing post-treatment violations just 10% as large as this worst pre-treatment violation ($\overline{M} = 0.1$) widens the CI to $[-0.040, 0.344]$, already including zero. At $\overline{M} = 1$ (post-treatment bias as large as the worst pre-treatment violation), the CI is $[-0.366, 0.444]$; at $\overline{M} = 2$, it is $[-0.444, 0.444]$. With 7 treated clusters, the pre-treatment coefficients are estimated imprecisely, making the maximum pre-treatment coefficient—which governs the allowed post-treatment bias in the RM framework—a noisy upper bound on genuine trend violations.

This fragility does not invalidate the identification. The parallel trends assumption in this paper rests on three pieces of evidence that do not depend on the HonestDiD framework: (1) flat pre-trends during two years of severe agrarian depression, when an economic confounder would predict divergence; (2) the FEct equivalence test (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2022), which provides out-of-sample validation immune to overfitting ($p = 0.70$; Appendix C.7); and (3) the spatial permutation test, which rejects the null at $p = 0.041$ even under the conservative spatially constrained design (Appendix C.1). The HonestDiD result is reported here for completeness; the identification argument does not rely on it.

C.9. Membership-Weighted Organization Density

The baseline analysis uses organization counts per capita as the outcome. As an alternative, Table A.11 uses total membership (summed reported membership of existing organizations) per 100,000 population. About 48% of grassroots organizations report membership size; those without are dropped. Membership is winsorized at the 99th percentile to limit outlier influence.

Because individual membership sizes are highly variable, the outcome is log-transformed: $\log(1 + \text{membership density per 100k})$. The standard DD yields an NP $\times$ Post coefficient of 0.99 log points at +12 months ($p = 0.029$), corresponding to roughly a 170% increase in membership density. Cardinality matching on five economic covariates yields a matched coefficient of 1.26 log points ($p < 0.001$), corresponding to a 252% increase. Both specifications remain stable and significant through the prewar endpoint (Table A.11). The event study (Figure A.18) shows flat pre-trends and a sharp discontinuity at the shock for both the standard and matched specifications.

Outcome	Log(1 + members per 100k)							
	Standard DD				*Cardinality Matching DD*			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP)	2.27 [1.85]							
NP × Post	0.990**	1.038**	1.057**	1.059**	1.258***	1.299***	1.206***	1.188***
	(0.429)	(0.442)	(0.470)	(0.484)	(0.170)	(0.124)	(0.093)	(0.109)
Controls								
Metropolitan × Post	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Econ. Profile × Post	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Matched prefectures	—	—	—	—	12	12	12	12
Observations	1,363	1,927	2,914	3,713	348	492	744	948
R^2 (within)	0.069	0.062	0.052	0.048	0.495	0.574	0.571	0.564

Table A.11: Membership-Weighted Organization Density

Note: Outcome: $\log(1 + \text{total membership per 100k})$. Only organizations with non-missing membership data are included (48% of grassroots orgs). Membership winsorized at 99th percentile. Columns 1–4: standard TWFE DD on all prefectures. Columns 5–8: cardinality matching (5 covariates, SMD < 0.25, 12 matched prefectures) with economic profile covariates × Post. Clustered (Prefecture & Month) standard errors. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.



Figure A.18: Membership-Weighted Event Study (Log)

Note: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals from the event-study specification using $\log(1 + \text{membership density per 100k})$ as the outcome. Open circles with light-gray CIs: standard DD; filled circles with dark-gray CIs: cardinality-matched DD. Reference period: April 1932.

C.10. Metropolitan Event Study

Figure A.19 shows that metropolitan prefectures display pre-treatment trends and gradual growth, with no discontinuity at the shock date. The discrete jump is specific to the periphery.



Figure A.19: Metropolitan Prefectures Show Pre-Trends, Not a Discontinuity

Note: Points show coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from the event-study specification.

C.11. Flow Event Study

Figure A.20 plots the event-study estimates using the flow of new grassroots right-wing organizations founded per month per 100,000 population as the outcome, rather than the stock of existing organizations. The stock measure captures the operative infrastructure at each point in time—counting every organization whose founding date falls on or before the period and whose dissolution date (if any) falls after—while the flow isolates the timing of new foundings. A 3-month centered moving average smooths the raw monthly counts, which are sparse (most prefecture-months have zero new foundings). The flow event study shows noisier coefficients than the stock, reflecting this sparseness. The NP founding differential spikes at the May 1932 shock then subsides; the sustained divergence in Figure 4 arises because founded organizations persist in the stock.



Figure A.20: Flow Event Study: New Organization Foundings per Month

Note: NP × relative month coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Outcome: 3-month centered moving average of newly founded grassroots right-wing organizations per 100,000 population. Reference period: April 1932. Dashed vertical line marks May 1932 (May 15 shock). The flow is inherently sparse—most prefecture-months have zero new foundings—so the stock measure (Figure 4) is the preferred specification for inference.

Outcome	New Orgs per 100k (3-mo MA)			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Window:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [NP]	0.016			
NP × Post	0.0100	0.0025	−0.0022	−0.0033
	(0.0082)	(0.0063)	(0.0056)	(0.0057)
Controls				
Metropolitan × Post	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit Statistics				
Observations	1,363	1,927	2,914	3,713
R^2	0.402	0.366	0.297	0.258

Table A.12: Flow DD: New Organization Foundings

Note: Unit of analysis: prefecture × month. Outcome: 3-month centered moving average of newly founded grassroots right-wing organizations per 100,000 population. The NP × Post coefficient is insignificant across all windows, reflecting the transient nature of the founding spike: new foundings surge at the shock but quickly subside. The stock measure captures the persistent infrastructure these foundings create. Clustered (prefecture & month) standard errors in parentheses. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

C.12. Full Coefficient Table

Table A.13 reports the full coefficient table for the main DiD specification, including all control variables. Columns 1–4 present the baseline TWFE DD on all prefectures; columns 5–8 present the cardinality-matched DD (5-covariate matching, SMD < 0.25, 12 matched prefectures) with the five matching covariates interacted with the post-shock indicator.

Outcome	Org Density (per 100k)							
	Standard DD				*Cardinality Matching DD*			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Pre-treat. mean [SD] (NP)	0.283 [0.208]							
NP × Post	0.2029***	0.2362***	0.2629***	0.2588**	0.2042***	0.2310***	0.2447**	0.2526**
	(0.0497)	(0.0618)	(0.0950)	(0.1052)	(0.0309)	(0.0409)	(0.0838)	(0.1028)
Metropolitan × Post	0.3912***	0.5676***	0.7796***	0.8789***				
	(0.1146)	(0.1430)	(0.1497)	(0.1465)				
Econ. Shock × Post					10.65	14.67	13.04	7.25
					(15.65)	(23.80)	(42.72)	(52.70)
Rice Share × Post					0.651	0.543	1.284	1.646
					(0.553)	(1.084)	(2.119)	(2.641)
Sharecropper Rate × Post					0.374***	0.617**	0.798*	0.821
					(0.117)	(0.201)	(0.454)	(0.549)
Income 1931 pc × Post					−25.11***	−31.01***	−46.94***	−53.57***
					(3.86)	(6.46)	(14.40)	(17.74)
Agri. Dependence × Post					−1.970***	−2.100**	−2.834	−2.872
					(0.400)	(0.848)	(1.902)	(2.338)
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Matched prefectures	—	—	—	—	12	12	12	12
Observations	1,363	1,927	2,914	3,713	348	492	744	948

Table A.13: Full Coefficient Table

Note: Columns 1–4: TWFE DD on all prefectures with Metropolitan × Post control only. Columns 5–8: matching-adjusted TWFE DD on cardinality-matched non-metropolitan sample (SMD tolerance 0.25; 12 matched prefectures) with the five matching covariates × Post. Prefecture and month fixed effects; clustered (Prefecture & Month) standard errors. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

D. Parliamentary Speech Analysis

Historians document that establishment politicians struck Faustian bargains during this period, co-opting antiparty hostility to outmaneuver internal rivals, with both major parties moving "steadily to the right," "outflanking each other to support army action," and "marginalizing liberal internationalists" (Young 2024, p. 132). Given electoral incentives, MPs from prefectures where Imperial Way organizations proliferated had reason to accommodate the new ideological environment—and this accommodation should be disproportionately visible among NP politicians, where the organizational surge was concentrated.

I classify 611,146 lower-house speeches spanning 1920–1945 using a fine-tuned BERT classifier trained on three categories (pro-military, autocratic, and other) and match elected candidates to their speech records across election terms 14–21. The classifier achieves strong performance on autocratic content (F1 = 0.72) but weaker performance on pro-military content (F1 = 0.37), reflecting the difficulty of distinguishing ideological militarism from routine military policy discussion; Appendix I validates that this does not bias the cross-prefectural comparison, since the combined right-wing share used here aggregates both categories.[11] Figure A.21 plots the mean right-wing speech share by election term, averaging across prefecture-level means so that each prefecture receives equal weight. Before the shock, the northern periphery and other prefectures track closely. After the 19th election (1936), a gap opens: MPs from northern periphery prefectures shift further rightward than those from the rest of the country, and the divergence persists through the wartime 21st election (1942). The overlaid bars show that radical-right vote shares are comparable or higher outside the northern periphery, so vote shifts toward radical-right parties cannot explain the speech divergence.

I aggregate to the prefecture × election-term level—matching the plot—and estimate a standard difference-in-differences:

[11] Candidates are matched by name between the election records and Diet proceedings. Of 979 matched elected speakers, 566 (58%) appear in multiple terms. For each speaker × election term, I compute the sentence-weighted share of pro-military and autocratic speech. Non-speakers are coded as zero. Appendix I describes the classifier architecture and validation.



Figure A.21: Right-Wing Speech Diverges in the Northern Periphery

Note: Lines (left axis): mean right-wing speech share across election terms 14–21 (1920–1942). Bars (right axis): mean radical-right vote share (narrow definition, excluding Shōwakai and Kokumin Dōmei). For each prefecture × election term, I average across all elected MPs (non-speakers coded as zero for speech), then average across prefectures within each group. Northern periphery: Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, Niigata.

$$\overline{\text{RWShare}}_{p,t} = \beta\big(\text{NP}_p \times \text{Post}_t\big) + \alpha_p + \psi_t + \varepsilon_{p,t}$$

where $\overline{\text{RWShare}}_{p,t}$ is the mean right-wing speech share across all elected MPs from prefecture p in election term t (non-speakers coded as zero), NP_p indicates the seven northern periphery prefectures, and Post_t equals one for election terms 19–21. Prefecture and election fixed effects absorb time-invariant prefecture differences and common shocks across elections. Standard errors are clustered by prefecture.

At the election-term level (columns 1–2), the NP × Post coefficient is 0.016 among speakers and 0.014 among all elected MPs—but not statistically significant ($p = 0.35$ and 0.16), reflecting the limited power of 7 treated prefectures observed over 8 election terms. Columns 3–4 re-estimate the same specification on a prefecture × year panel (post = 1933 onward), which provides substantially more time variation. The yearly estimates are 0.022 among speakers ($p = 0.047$) and 0.009 among all elected ($p = 0.043$; wild cluster bootstrap one-sided $p = 0.029$). Randomization inference permuting the NP label across 5,000 random draws of 7 prefectures yields a one-sided p-value of 0.079 (two-

Outcome	Mean RW Speech Share (prefecture level)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel	Election Term		Year	
Sample	Speakers	All Elected	Speakers	All Elected
Pre-treat. mean [SD]	0.042 [0.031]	0.024 [0.031]	0.047 [0.021]	0.020 [0.021]
NP × Post	0.0159	0.0138	0.0220**	0.0093**
	(0.0169)	(0.0097)	(0.0108)	(0.0045)
Controls				
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit Statistics				
Observations	365	368	1,164	1,196
R^2	0.340	0.237	0.183	0.149

Table A.14: Northern Periphery MPs Shift Rightward After the Shock

Note: DV: mean right-wing speech share across elected MPs from the prefecture. "Speakers" averages over MPs who spoke at least once; "All Elected" includes non-speakers coded as zero. Columns 1–2: prefecture × election term (terms 14–21); Post = elections 19–21. Columns 3–4: prefecture × year (1920–1945); Post = 1933 onward. All specifications include prefecture and period fixed effects. SEs clustered by prefecture. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

sided $p = 0.155$), indicating that the speech result is suggestive but not robust to exact inference—consistent with the limited power of 7 treated clusters.[12] Replacing the NP indicator with continuous pre-treatment Imperial Way organizational density produces null results (Appendix E), indicating that the speech shift is associated with the NP-specific mobilization process rather than with organizational infrastructure generically.

[12]NP-prefecture MPs' speeches have a slightly higher pre-treatment right-wing classification rate (2.1% vs. 1.6%), consistent with the regional salience of military topics near the 8th Division. This level difference is absorbed by prefecture fixed effects; the DD identifies the *change* in classification rates, which requires only that any differential misclassification be stable over time. Stratifying the classifier's predicted right-wing sentence share by NP status confirms that misclassification is not differential: the overall right-wing share is 1.90% for NP speeches and 1.84% for non-NP speeches, a difference small enough to be attributable to content rather than systematic classifier bias.

Outcome	Mean RW Speech Share (prefecture level)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel	Election Term		Year	
Sample	Speakers	All Elected	Speakers	All Elected
IWF Density × Post	0.1072*	0.0228	−0.0086	−0.0142
	(0.0638)	(0.0589)	(0.0758)	(0.0252)
Controls				
Prefecture FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit Statistics				
Observations	329	368	1,126	1,149
R^2	0.237	0.232	0.187	0.142

Table A.15: Pre-Existing Imperial Way Organizational Density Does Not Predict Speech Radicalization

Note: Same specification as Table A.14 with continuous pre-treatment Imperial Way organizational density (mean across election terms 14–18, per 100,000 population) replacing the NP binary. Columns 1–2: prefecture × election term (terms 14–21); Post = elections 19–21. Columns 3–4: prefecture × year (1920–1945); Post = 1933 onward. SEs clustered by prefecture. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

E. Organizational Density Placebo: Speech

If the parliamentary radicalization result in Table A.14 reflects a generic relationship between pre-existing organizational infrastructure and speech content—rather than the post-shock mobilization specific to the northern periphery—then replacing the NP indicator with a continuous measure of pre-treatment Imperial Way organizational density should produce comparable effects. Table A.15 tests this by estimating the same specification as Table A.14 with mean pre-treatment Imperial Way organizational density (per 100,000 population, averaged across election terms 14–18) in place of the NP binary.

The coefficients are insignificant in every specification except the underpowered election-term speakers panel (column 1, $p < 0.10$). In the year panel (columns 3–4), where the NP treatment is significant, the Imperial Way density coefficients are slightly negative. Figure A.22 confirms visually: prefectures with any pre-treatment Imperial Way organizational presence track those without it closely, with no post-shock divergence.



Figure A.22: No Speech Divergence by Pre-Treatment Imperial Way Organizational Density

Note: Mean right-wing speech share by election term for prefectures with and without pre-treatment Imperial Way organizations (presence defined as mean Imperial Way organizational density > 0 across election terms 14–18). Shaded region marks the post-treatment period (elections 19–21).



Figure A.23: DDD Is Insensitive to Excluding the Most Ambiguous Keyword

Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the DDD coefficient (NP × Post × Imperial Way type) across four post-treatment windows. Filled circles: baseline classification using all five keywords. Open circles: reduced classification excluding *kokka kaizō* (state reconstruction). All specifications include prefecture × type and quarter × type fixed effects, with standard errors two-way clustered by prefecture and quarter.

F. DDD Keyword Sensitivity

The DDD result in Table 2 classifies organizations as Imperial Way using five keywords. The most potentially ambiguous is *kokka kaizō* (state reconstruction), which appears in Kita Ikki's 1919 manifesto and was occasionally used by non-Kōdōha nationalists. Figure A.23 repeats the DDD excluding *kokka kaizō*, retaining only four keywords: *kōdō*, *Shōwa ishin*, *seitō kaishō*, and *tennō shinsei*.

Across all four windows, the reduced-keyword estimates are virtually identical to the baseline: 0.50 vs. 0.49 at +12 months, 0.64 vs. 0.64 at +24 months, 0.62 vs. 0.62 through February 1936, and 0.48 vs. 0.48 through the prewar endpoint. Removing *kokka kaizō* slightly *increases* the point estimates, confirming that the compositional result is not driven by this ambiguous term.



Figure A.24: DDD Identifying Variation at Raw Quarterly Frequency

Note: IW-minus-non-IW founding gap (mean per prefecture-quarter) at raw quarterly frequency, matching the data that enters the DDD regression. Solid: northern periphery; dashed: all other prefectures. Dashed vertical line marks May 15, 1932. Figure 5 panel (b) shows the same quantity smoothed with a four-quarter centered moving average.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
Flow (new foundings)				
NP × Post × IW	0.485*	0.638**	0.617***	0.483***
	(0.280)	(0.255)	(0.217)	(0.163)
Stock (existing orgs)				
NP × Post × IW	4.329	5.570	6.634	8.574
	(2.910)	(3.608)	(4.081)	(4.740)

Table A.16: DDD: Flow vs. Stock Measure

Note: Flow outcome: count of newly founded organizations per prefecture-quarter-type. Stock outcome: count of existing organizations per prefecture-quarter-type (raw counts, not per capita). Both specifications include prefecture × type and quarter × type fixed effects, with standard errors two-way clustered by prefecture and quarter. .***: 0.01, .**: 0.05, .*: 0.1.

G. Stock-Based DDD

The main DDD uses the flow of new foundings per prefecture-quarter-type because ideology is classified at the time of founding. As a robustness check, I replicate the DDD using the stock measure (number of existing organizations of each type) as the outcome. The stock-based DDD asks whether the standing IW share in the NP diverged after the shock, rather than whether new foundings were disproportionately IW.

The stock-based DDD coefficient is positive at every window and grows over time as newly founded IW organizations accumulate in the stock. It reaches marginal significance ($p = 0.077$) at the longest window. The attenuation relative to the flow measure is expected: pre-treatment non-IW organizations that persist in the stock dilute the post-shock compositional shift. The consistency in sign across both measures confirms that the IW-specific surge documented in the main text is not an artifact of the flow measure.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Treatment Period:	+12m	+24m	~Feb 36	~Jul 37
NP × Post × IW	0.522	0.594	0.550	0.483
	(0.273)	(0.260)	(0.204)	(0.163)
Cluster-robust p	0.066	0.029	0.010	0.005
Randomization inference p (one-sided)	0.126	0.030	0.013	< 0.001
Randomization inference p (two-sided)	0.405	0.273	0.232	0.192

Table A.17: DDD Randomization Inference Across Post-Treatment Windows

Note: 5,000 permutations of the NP label across 40 non-NP prefectures. Cluster-robust p-values are two-way clustered by prefecture and quarter. One-sided p: fraction of permutation draws with $\beta_1 \geq$ observed. Two-sided p: fraction with $|\beta_1| \geq |\text{observed}|$.

H. DDD Randomization Inference Across Windows

Table A.17 reports the full progression across all four post-treatment windows. The test permutes the NP label across 5,000 random draws of 7 from 40 non-NP prefectures, matching the analysis sample. Since the hypothesis is directional—the NP should gain more IW organizations after the shock, not fewer—I report both one-sided and two-sided p-values.

The one-sided RI p-value reaches significance from +24 months onward (0.030) and strengthens to $p < 0.001$ at the prewar endpoint. The two-sided p-values are larger because the permutation distribution includes draws where metro prefectures (with higher organizational density baselines) receive the NP label, generating large negative DDD coefficients that inflate the two-sided tail. The one-sided test is the appropriate standard for a directional hypothesis, and its progression—strengthening monotonically as the IW organizational advantage cumulates—is consistent with a real effect rather than a spurious spike.

I. BERT Speech Classifier

The right-wing speech measures used in Table A.14 are generated by a fine-tuned BERT classifier that labels each sentence in the lower-house Diet proceedings as *pro-military*, *autocratic*, or *other*. This section documents the classification pipeline, category definitions, model architecture, and validation performance.

I.1. Classification Categories

The classifier assigns each sentence to one of three categories:

1. **Pro-military** (label 0). Militarist ideology: advocacy of military expansion, glorification of military force, or aggressive expansionism as a positive goal (e.g., **軍國主義**, **皇軍**, **聖戰**, **膺懲**). Routine budget or personnel discussions without ideological framing are excluded.
2. **Autocratic** (label 1). Opposition to parliamentary democracy and advocacy of authoritarian alternatives: Imperial Way ideology (**皇道**), Shōwa Restoration (**昭和維新**), dissolution of political parties (**政黨解消**), national reconstruction (**國家改造**), kokutai defense (**國體擁護**), national socialism (**國家社會主義**), and Imperial Rule Assistance (**翼賛**). General patriotism without autocratic content is excluded.
3. **Other** (label 2). All remaining content: routine policy discussion, parliamentary procedure, general patriotism, and social or economic debate.

When a sentence contains elements of both pro-military and autocratic, it is assigned to the category more central to its meaning, with ties broken in favor of autocratic. Table A.18 presents representative examples from the training set.

Class	Original	Translation
Pro-military	凶作一家ヲ破ルモ、國策國難ニ臨ンデハ酷寒滿蒙ノ最先出征ニ從ヒ、父兄ハ喜ンデ之ヲ送リ、健兒ハ勇ンデ死地ニ就ク *— Rep. Kumagai, 1934*	Though crop failure ruins the family, when national crisis calls they are the first to march into the bitter cold of Manchuria and Mongolia; fathers gladly send them off, and stalwart sons bravely go to their deaths.
Pro-military	滿洲事變ヲヤッテ退ケタ軍部デスヨ、今迄ノ傳統的屈從外交ヲ、カデ以テ轉回シタ軍部デスヨ、ダカラ何カヤルダラウト大衆ハ期待シテ居ル *— Rep. Nakano, 1934*	This is the military that carried out the Manchuria Incident! That used force to overturn our subservient diplomacy! The masses expect them to act.
Pro-military	此日本帝國ノ此皇軍ノ行動ヲ先ヅ前提ニ置イテ、曲我ニ在リト云フ立場ニ於テ、他ノ審制ニ之ヲ委ネルト云フコトデアルナラバ此派遣軍ノ名譽ハ全ク蹂躪セラルヽ *— Rep. Nakamura, 1929*	If we presume from the outset that the Imperial Army's actions were wrong and submit to foreign arbitration, the honor of our expeditionary forces will be utterly trampled.
Autocratic	堅忍不拔ノ國民性ヲ釀成セントセバ、皇道ヲ基調トシテ思想善導ニ努ム可カラザルコト明々白々ノ道理ナラズヤ *— Rep. Kageyama, 1935*	Is it not patently obvious that to cultivate an indomitable national character we must strive for thought guidance based on the Imperial Way?
Autocratic	其思想ガ表面ニ現ハレテ、サウシテ安寧秩序ヲ害スル、國體ニ反スルト云フコトニナレバ、罰スルコトハ私ハ當然ト思フ *— Education Minister Matsuda, 1935*	If such thoughts *[i.e., ideologies deemed subversive under the Peace Preservation Law]* manifest outwardly and harm public order, or contravene the national polity, then I consider their punishment only natural.
Autocratic	サウナリマスレバ、ドウシテモ美濃部君ノ說ハ國體ニ反スルモノダト云フコトニ結論セザルヲ得ヌデハゴザイマスマイカ *— Rep. Takeuchi, 1935*	If that is the case, must we not inevitably conclude that Professor Minobe's theory[13] contravenes the national polity?
Other	肥料管理法ニモ、何カ資金ノ調達ノ爲ニ、債券類似ノモノヲ發行スルトカ云フヤウナコトガアリマスガ、サウ云フコトハナイノデスカ *— Rep. Takeuchi, 1929*	Does the Fertilizer Control Act also provide for issuing bond-like instruments to raise funds, or is there no such provision?
Other	總テ實施設計ト云フモノニ付テハ何等御調査ニナラズシテ、實地調查モシナイデオヤリニナリマスカ *— Chair Ōta, 1926*	Do you proceed without any investigation of the implementation plans, without even conducting a field survey?
Other	所得稅ヲ財源ニ使ハレル國防計畫ノ陸海軍ノ豫算ニ就テ數字ヲ簡單デアルガ承リタイ *— Rep. Ōguchi, 1920*	I would like to hear briefly the figures on army and navy budgets for the national defense plan financed by income tax.

Table A.18: Example Sentences from the BERT Training Set

Note: Three representative sentences per class from the labeled training data. Sentences are drawn from lower-house Diet proceedings (1918–1937).

I.2. Pipeline

The classification pipeline proceeds in five steps:

1. **Candidate sampling.** The full speech corpus (1.85 million records, 1918–1937) is streamed and segmented into sentences. Candidates are drawn from seven pools: two tiers of keyword matches per category (core and broad), hard negatives (non-keyword sentences from speeches that contain keywords elsewhere), easy negatives (sentences from keyword-free speeches), and a corpus-random reservoir sample. This yields approximately 3,000 candidate sentences.

[13] Minobe Tatsukichi's Emperor-as-Organ Theory (*tennō kikan-setsu*): the constitutional doctrine that the emperor was an organ of the state rather than its sovereign. Suppressed in the 1935 *kokutai meicho* (national polity clarification) campaign.

2. **RAG indexing.** Markdown descriptions and structured records of known right-wing organizations are indexed into a vector store (ChromaDB with multilingual-e5-base embeddings) to provide contextual reference during labeling.
3. **Manual labeling.** Each candidate sentence is read alongside the five most similar right-wing organization descriptions retrieved from the vector store. The author classifies the sentence into the three categories, recording a label and brief reasoning. This yields a final training set of 7,126 labeled sentences.
4. **Fine-tuning.** A pre-trained Japanese BERT model (`tohoku-nlp/bert-base-japanese-v3`) is fine-tuned with a three-class linear head on the labeled data. Training uses balanced class weights to address class imbalance, AdamW optimization with learning rate 2×10^{-5}, gradient clipping at 1.0, and macro F1 as the model selection criterion.
5. **Full-corpus inference.** The fine-tuned model is applied to all 460,528 sentences from 375,377 lower-house speeches (1918–1937). For each sentence, the model outputs three-class probabilities; for each speech, sentence-level predictions are aggregated into counts and shares of pro-military, autocratic, and right-wing content.

I.3. Model Architecture and Training

The model consists of a pre-trained BERT encoder (`tohoku-nlp/bert-base-japanese-v3`, pre-trained on Japanese Wikipedia by the Tohoku NLP Group) followed by dropout ($p = 0.1$) and a linear projection from the [CLS] token representation to three output logits. The 7,126 labeled sentences are split into a training set (5,700 sentences, 80%) and a validation set (1,426 sentences, 20%) using a stratified random split. Cross-entropy loss with inverse-frequency class weights ($w_{\text{mil}} = 3.58$, $w_{\text{antidem}} = 2.96$, $w_{\text{other}} = 0.42$) addresses the imbalance between the dominant *other* class and the two substantive categories.

Table A.19 reports the training history. Validation macro F1 peaks at epoch 3 (0.692) before declining, indicating overfitting. The epoch-3 checkpoint is selected as the final model.

Epoch	Train Loss	Val Macro F1	Selected
1	0.695	0.569	
2	0.496	0.642	
3	0.380	0.692	✓
4	0.243	0.668	
5	0.177	0.661	

Table A.19: Training History

Note: Validation macro F1 peaks at epoch 3 before overfitting sets in. Training on 5,700 labeled sentences with balanced class weights and AdamW (lr $= 2 \times 10^{-5}$, max sequence length = 256 tokens). Model selected at highest validation macro F1.

I.4. Validation Performance

Table A.20 reports classification performance on the held-out validation set (1,426 sentences). Overall accuracy is 82%, with weighted F1 of 0.82. The *other* class, which comprises 79% of the validation set, achieves the highest performance (F1 = 0.89). The *autocratic* class performs well (F1 = 0.72), while the *pro-military* class is weaker (F1 = 0.37), reflecting both its smaller sample size (132 validation examples) and the difficulty of distinguishing ideological militarism from routine military policy discussion. The macro-averaged F1 is 0.66.

Class	Precision	Recall	F1	Support
Pro-military	0.35	0.39	0.37	132
Autocratic	0.72	0.73	0.72	161
Other	0.89	0.88	0.89	1,133
Accuracy			0.82	1,426
Macro average	0.66	0.67	0.66	1,426
Weighted average	0.82	0.82	0.82	1,426

Table A.20: BERT Classifier Validation Performance

Note: Per-class and aggregate metrics on the held-out validation set. Validation set (20% stratified holdout, $n = 1,426$). Labels from manual annotation. Precision, recall, and F1 computed per class; macro and weighted averages across classes.

The relatively low pro-military F1 is unlikely to bias the main speech analysis, which aggregates pro-military and autocratic predictions into a combined right-wing speech share. Any pro-military sentences misclassified as *other* reduce the level of measured right-wing speech but do not affect the cross-prefectural variation that identifies the coefficient in Table A.14, provided misclassification rates are uncorrelated with organizational density.

J. NP Leader Penetration and Post-Shock Violence

Appendix under revision.

K. Violence-Aim Keyword Classifier

Appendix under revision.

L. NP-Led Organizations: Full Sample Robustness

Appendix under revision.

M. NP-Connected Leaders

Appendix under revision.

N. NP Leaders: Core Founders

Appendix under revision.

O. Named Civilian Ideologues

The 15 named civilian ideologues used in the person-panel test of Section 3.3 are listed in Table A.21. The set comprises principals who founded or led a major civilian right-wing organization, or who were the chief architect of a documented violent plot, between approximately 1920 and 1940. Selection draws on the standard historiography of pre-war Japanese radical-right movements (Havens 1974; Kitaoka 2021; Shillony 1973; Skya 2009); it is a hand-curated set rather than an algorithmically generated one. Two cases are borderline: Kita and Nishida both had brief military careers (Nishida was an active army officer 1923–1925 before his dismissal), and the test treats them as civilian; the structural finding does not hinge on the inclusion of either individual.

Name	**Romanized**	**Principal affiliation / role**
北一輝	Kita Ikki	Yūzonsha; author of *Nihon Kaizō Hōan Taikō*, the manifesto invoked by the February 26 rebels
大川周明	Ōkawa Shūmei	Yūzonsha; Kōchisha; planner, March and October 1931 plots
井上日召	Inoue Nisshō	Blood Pledge League (Ketsumeidan) leader; mastermind, February–March 1932 assassinations
西田税	Nishida Mitsugi	Kita disciple; civilian liaison to the young-officer movement; former army officer, dismissed 1925
満川亀太郎	Mitsugawa Kametarō	Yūzonsha co-founder; pan-Asianist theorist
橘孝三郎	Tachibana Kōzaburō	Aikyōjuku founder; civilian wing, May 15 Incident
権藤成卿	Gondō Seikyō	Agrarianist ideologue; intellectual influence on Aikyōjuku and the Blood Pledge League
安岡正篤	Yasuoka Masahiro	Kinkei Gakuin; Confucian-nationalist mentor to senior bureaucrats
頭山満	Tōyama Mitsuru	Genyōsha elder; pan-Asianist patron
内田良平	Uchida Ryōhei	Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) founder
赤尾敏	Akao Bin	Kenkokukai founder
本間憲一郎	Honma Ken'ichirō	Shinpeitai 1933 plot
天野辰夫	Amano Tatsuo	Shinpeitai 1933 ringleader
清水行之助	Shimizu Yukinosuke	Shinpeitai 1933 plot
影山正治	Kageyama Masaharu	Shinpeitai 1933; Seven-Five Incident chain

Table A.21: Named Civilian Ideologues Used in the Structural Tests

Note: The 15 individuals whose organizational affiliations define TieIdeologue_{it} in Section 3.3. Each is identified in the historiography as a principal of a major civilian right-wing organization or the chief architect of a documented violent plot. Source: `analysis/data/source/radical_ideologues.csv`.

P. Violence Episode Participants

This appendix lists named participants in the major violent episodes of 1930–1936, cross-referenced against the Nagata (2014) right-wing organization registry. **Org**: ✓ = person appears in the organizational membership data. **Mil.**: ✓ = active military officer at the time of the event; *former* = former military (retired, dismissed, or reserve at the time of the event); blank = civilian. Overall, 81% of named violence participants (111/137) appear in the organizational network; the match rate is 89% for civilians and 69% for military personnel. The unmatched military participants are predominantly junior officers who joined through the military chain of command rather than civic organizations. Sources: Chūseidō (1934), Shillony (1973), Kitaoka (2021), Kitabatake court records, Japanese Wikipedia.

Org	Mil.	Name	Romanized	Role
		Wakatsuki Attack 1930-01 *Three right-wing activists attacked PM Wakatsuki Reijirō.*		
✓		大澤武三郎	Osawa Takesaburō	Perpetrator
✓	*former*	野口進	Noguchi Susumu	Perpetrator
		松井治雄	Matsui Haruo	Perpetrator
		Hamaguchi Assassination 浜口雄幸暗殺 1930-11-14 *Right-winger Sagoya Tomeo shot PM Hamaguchi at Tokyo Station over the London Naval Treaty.*		
✓		佐郷屋留雄	Sagoya Tomeo	Perpetrator
		March Incident 三月事件 1931-03 *Sakurakai officers plotted to surround the Diet and install Gen. Ugaki as PM. Cancelled before execution.*		
✓	✓	橋本欣五郎	Hashimoto Kingorō	Lt. Col.; Sakurakai founder, chief planner
✓	✓	永田鐵山	Nagata Tetsuzan	Colonel; planner
✓	✓	重藤千秋	Shigefuji Chiaki	Colonel; Sakurakai co-founder
✓		大川周明	Ōkawa Shūmei	Civilian ideologue
		October Incident 十月事件 1931-10 *Second Sakurakai plot to bomb the cabinet. Leaked; 10-day confinement.*		
✓	✓	橋本欣五郎	Hashimoto Kingorō	Major; chief planner
✓		大川周明	Ōkawa Shūmei	Civilian ideologue
✓	✓	長勇	Chō Isamu	Major; core conspirator
✓	✓	田中清	Tanaka Kiyoshi	Participant
		Saionji Plot 1932-01 *Plot against elder statesman Saionji Kinmochi.*		
✓		五十嵐軍太	Igarashi Gundai	Leader
		Shanghai Plot 1932-01 *Overseas assassination plot in Shanghai.*		
✓		桐田正治	Kirita Masaharu	Planner
✓		熊谷一夫	Kumagai Kazuo	Planner
		Blood Pledge League 血盟団事件 1932-02 *"One person, one kill." Assassinated Inoue Junnosuke (Feb 9) and Dan Takuma (Mar 5).*		
✓		井上日召	Inoue Nisshō	Mastermind; life sentence
✓		小沼正	Onuma Tadashi	Assassinated Inoue Junnosuke; life
✓		菱沼五郎	Hishinuma Gorō	Assassinated Dan Takuma; life
✓		古内榮司	Furuuchi Eiji	Deputy commander; 15 yr
✓		四元義隆	Yotsumoto Yoshitaka	Liaison; 15 yr
		池袋征八郎	Ikebukuro Shōhachirō	Member
✓		久木田祐弘	Kukita Yuhiro	Member; 6 yr
✓		田中邦雄	Tanaka Kunio	Member; 6 yr
✓		須田太郎	Suda Tarō	Member; 6 yr
✓		田倉利之	Takura Toshiyuki	Member; 6 yr
✓		森憲二	Mori Kenji	Member; 4 yr
		星子毅	Hoshiko Takeshi	Member
✓		黒澤大二	Kurosawa Daiji	Founding member
✓		川崎長光	Kawasaki Nagamitsu	Founding member
✓		照沼初太郎	Terunuma Hatsutarō	Founding member
✓	✓	藤井齊	Fujii Hitoshi	Arms supplier (Navy)
✓		伊藤彰道	Itō Akimichi	Liaison

Table A.22: Violence Episode Participants (1 of 3)

Note: Named perpetrators cross-referenced against the organizational network. **Org**: ✓ = in Nagata (2014) data. **Mil.**: ✓ = active military officer at time of event; *former* = former military (retired, dismissed, or in reserve); blank = civilian. Feb. 26 listed in Table A.25.

Org	Mil.	Name	Romanized	Role
May 15 Incident 五・一五事件 1932-05-15				
Naval officers and army cadets assassinated PM Inukai. Attacked Interior Ministry and Seiyūkai HQ.				
✓		大川周明	Okawa Shūmei	Background planner
✓	✓	三上卓	Mikami Takashi	Navy Lt.; shot PM Inukai
✓	✓	古賀清志	Koga Kiyoshi	Navy Lt.; Interior Min. attack
	✓	山岸宏	Yamagishi Hiroshi	Navy Lt.; PM residence
✓	✓	大庭春雄	Ōba Haruo	Navy Sub-Lt.
	✓	中村義雄	Nakamura Yoshio	Navy Lt.; Seiyūkai HQ
✓	✓	村上功	Murakami Isao	Perpetrator
✓	✓	村上格之	Murakami Kakunosuke	Perpetrator
✓	✓	伊東亀城	Itō Kameki	Navy Sub-Lt.
✓	✓	太田武	Ōta Takeshi	Participant
✓		橘孝三郎	Tachibana Kōzaburō	Aikyōjuku founder
✓		頭山秀三	Tōyama Shūzō	Accomplice
✓		井上日召	Inoue Nisshō	Background planner
✓	✓	菅波三郎	Suganami Saburō	Army planner
✓	✓	大岸頼好	Ōgishi Yoriyoshi	Army planner
✓	✓	對馬勝雄	Tsushima Katsuo	Army planner
✓		西田稔	Nishida Minoru	Civilian coordinator
Shinketsusei 1932-07				
Right-wing violence plot.				
✓		脇坂利德	Wakisaka Rinori	Planner
Embassy Plot 1933-01				
Plot against foreign embassy.				
✓		杉森政之助	Sugimori Masanosuke	Planner
✓		野口藤七	Noguchi Yashichi	Planner
July 5 Incident 1933-07-05				
Right-wing attack.				
✓		前田虎雄	Maeda Torao	Ringleader
✓		影山正治	Kageyama Masaharu	Ringleader
Kikansetsu Incident 機関説事件 1933-11				
Campaign against Emperor-as-organ constitutional theory. Mass mobilization against liberal scholars.				
✓		蓑田胸喜	Minoda Muneki	Fire starter
✓	*former*	菊池武夫	Kikuchi Takeo	Diet igniter
✓		菊地大八	Kikuchi Daihachi	Attacker
✓		柏木勇	Kashiwagi Isamu	Protester
		若林祐三	Wakabayashi Yūzō	Protester
✓		藤吉男	Fuji Yoshio	Accomplice
✓		鬼倉重次郎	Onikura Shigejirō	Activist
✓		入江種矩	Irie Tanenori	Organizer
✓		葛生修吉	Kuzuu Yoshihisa	Organizer
✓		赤尾敏	Akao Bin	Committee member
✓		岩田愛之助	Iwata Ainosuke	Organizer
✓	*former*	大井成元	Ōi Narumoto	Leader
✓	*former*	石光眞臣	Ishimitsu Maomi	Leader
✓		堤清	Tsutsumi Kiyoshi	Militant

Table A.23: Violence Episode Participants (2 of 3)

Note: Continued. Same notation.

Org	Mil.	Name	Romanized	Role
		Shinpeitai Incident 神兵隊事件 1933–34 *Civilian-led plot to bomb government buildings. Discovered before execution.*		
✓		天野辰夫	Amano Tatsuo	Ringleader
✓		前田虎雄	Maeda Torao	Commander
	✓	山口三郎	Yamaguchi Saburō	Navy liaison
✓	✓	安田銕之助	Yasuda Chūnosuke	Army liaison
✓		鈴木善一	Suzuki Zenichi	Squad leader
✓		影山正治	Kageyama Masaharu	Staff
✓		片岡駿	Kataoka Shun	Staff
✓		奥戸足百	Okudo Taruhyaku	Staff
✓		長谷川幸男	Hasegawa Yukio	Squad leader
✓		高嶋仁	Takashima Jin	Squad leader
		茂呂清輝	Moro Nobuhisa	Squad leader
✓		瀧澤利量	Takizawa Rikazu	Squad leader
✓		中村武	Nakamura Takeshi	Member
		Ōkuma Bombing 1935-01 *Bombing targeting Ōkuma.*		
✓		鬼倉重次郎	Onikura Shigejirō	Perpetrator
		Nakajima Shooting 1935-08-12 *Shooting of Nakajima.*		
✓		三浦義一	Miura Yoshikazu	Director
		February 26 Incident 二・二六事件 1936-02-26 *Officers led 1,400 troops seizing central Tokyo; assassinated Takahashi, Saitō, Watanabe. Full roster in Table A.25.*		
		See Table A.25 for the complete court-martial roster (41 tried; 21 in org network).		
		Yasuda Incident 1938-01 *Attack by Yasuda.*		
✓		朝日午吾	Asahi Gogō	Perpetrator
		Tōjō Plot (Tōhō) 1939-01 *Plot against Tōjō, Tōhō faction.*		
✓		中野正剛	Nakano Seigō	Leader
✓		三田村武夫	Mitamura Takeo	Planner
		Tōjō Plot (Kyūshū) 1939-01 *Plot against Tōjō, Kyūshū faction.*		
✓		菊池峯三郎	Kikuchi Minesaburō	Leader
		Hiranuma–Ikeda Plot 1939-01 *Assassination plot against Hiranuma and Ikeda.*		
✓		奥野光雄	Okuno Mitsuo	Planner
		Konoe Plot 1940-01 *Assassination plot against PM Konoe.*		
✓		惠谷信	Etani Shin	Perpetrator
✓		幅原仁榮	Fukuhara Jinei	Perpetrator
✓		齊藤留五郎	Saitō Tomogorō	Perpetrator
		林弘	Hayashi Hiroshi	Perpetrator
		Hiranuma Shooting 1941-01 *Shooting of Hiranuma Kiichirō.*		
✓		西山直	Nishiyama Nao	Indicted
✓		片岡駿	Kataoka Shun	Indicted
✓		中村武	Nakamura Takeshi	Indicted
		土居三郎	Doi Saburō	Indicted

Table A.24: Violence Episode Participants (3 of 3)

Note: Continued. Same notation.

Q. Faction and Conspiracy Personnel Rosters

This appendix lists the personnel rosters used in the faction–organization analysis referenced in the introduction and Section 3.3. Table A.25 lists all Imperial Way faction members whose names appear in the right-wing organization source data, including both those not tried for the February 26 incident and the 41 persons tried by court-martial. Table A.27 lists the Control Faction core members appearing in organization data. Home prefecture is the registered domicile (*honseki*); officers from outside the northern periphery who were stationed there are discussed in the text. Sources: Shillony (1973), Kitaoka (2021), Kitabatake court records, Kotobank biographical database.

Org	Name	Romanized	Rank	Home	Feb. 26	NP Link
			Tried: civilian			
✓	北一輝	Kita Ikki	—	**Niigata**	Executed	Home
✓	水上源一	Mizukami Gen'ichi	Student (Nihon Univ)	—	Executed	—
			Senior leaders (not tried)			
✓	荒木貞夫	Araki Sadao	General	Tokyo		—
✓	眞崎甚三郎	Mazaki Jinzaburō	General	Saga		—
✓	柳川平助	Yanagawa Heisuke	Lt. Gen.	Saga		—
✓	小畑敏四郎	Obata Toshishirō	Maj. Gen.	Kōchi		—
			Young officer movement (not tried)			
✓	大岸頼好	Ōgishi Yoriyoshi	Captain	Kōchi		Posted: 5th Regt
✓	藤井齊	Fujii Hitoshi	Lt. Cmdr. (N)	Saga		—
✓	古賀清志	Koga Kiyoshi	Lt. (Navy)	Saga		—
✓	三上卓	Mikami Taku	Lt. (Navy)	Saga		—
✓	野田又男	Noda Matao	—	—		—
			Tried: former officers			
	磯部浅一	Isobe Asaichi	Intendant (dism.)	Yamaguchi	Executed	—
✓	村中孝次	Muranaka Kōji	Capt. (dism.)	Hokkaidō	Executed	—
✓	西田税	Nishida Mitsugi	Cav. 2nd Lt. (fmr.)	Tottori	Executed	—
✓	澁川善助	Shibukawa Zensuke	Cadet (dism.)	**Fukushima**	Executed	Home
	山本又	Yamamoto Mata	2nd Lt. (reserve)	Shizuoka	10 years	—
			Tried: active-duty officers			
✓	安藤輝三	Andō Teruzo	Captain	Gifu	Executed	—
	香田清貞	Kōda Kiyosada	Captain	Saga	Executed	—
	河野壽	Kōno Hisashi	Captain	Nagasaki	Suicide	—
	野中四郎	Nonaka Shirō	Captain	Okayama	Suicide	—
✓	栗原安秀	Kurihara Yasuhide	1st Lt.	Tokyo	Executed	—
	中橋基明	Nakahashi Motoaki	1st Lt.	Saga	Executed	—
	丹生誠忠	Nibu Seichū	1st Lt.	Kagoshima	Executed	—
	坂井直	Sakai Naoshi	1st Lt.	Mie	Executed	—
	竹嶌継夫	Takeshima Tsuguo	1st Lt.	Saga	Executed	—
	田中勝	Tanaka Masaru	1st Lt.	Yamaguchi	Executed	—
✓	對馬勝雄	Tsushima Katsuo	1st Lt.	**Aomori**	Executed	Home; 5th Regt, 8th Div.
	林八郎	Hayashi Hachirō	2nd Lt.	Tokyo	Executed	—
	中島莞爾	Nakajima Kanji	2nd Lt.	Saga	Executed	—
	高橋太郎	Takahashi Tarō	2nd Lt.	Saitama	Executed	—
	安田優	Yasuda Masaru	2nd Lt.	Kumamoto	Executed	—
	池田俊彦	Ikeda Toshihiko	2nd Lt.	Kagoshima	Life	—
	清原康平	Kiyohara Kōhei	2nd Lt.	Kumamoto	Life	—
	麦屋清済	Muguya Kiyozumi	2nd Lt.	Saitama	Life	—
✓	鈴木金次郎	Suzuki Kinjirō	2nd Lt.	Ibaraki	Life	—
	常盤稔	Tokiwa Minoru	2nd Lt.	Ōita	Life	—
	今泉義道	Imaizumi Yoshimichi	2nd Lt.	Kanagawa	4 years	—
			Tried: convicted indirect participants			
✓	山口一太郎	Yamaguchi Ichitarō	Captain	—	Life	—
✓	亀川哲也	Kamekawa Tetsuya	— (civilian)	—	Life	—
✓	満井佐吉	Mitsui Sakichi	Lt. Col.	Fukuoka	Indirect	—
✓	斎藤瀏	Saitō Ryū	Maj. Gen. (ret.)	—	Indirect	—
✓	末松太平	Suematsu Tahei	Captain	Fukuoka	Indirect	Posted: 5th Regt, 8th Div.
✓	菅波三郎	Suganami Saburō	Captain	Miyazaki	Indirect	—
✓	大藏榮一	Ōkura Eiichi	Captain	Ōita	Indirect	—
	鈴木五郎	Suzuki Gorō	Intendant	—	Indirect	—
	井上辰雄	Inoue Tatsuo	1st Lt.	—	Indirect	—
	新井勲	Arai Isao	1st Lt.	—	Indirect	—
	志岐孝人	Shiki Takato	1st Lt.	—	Indirect	—
✓	志村陸城	Shimura Rikujō	1st Lt.	—	Indirect	Posted: 5th Regt, 8th Div.
	塩田淑夫	Shioda Yoshio	1st Lt.	—	Indirect	—
	柳下良二	Yanagishita Ryōji	1st Lt.	—	Indirect	—

Table A.25: Imperial Way Faction Personnel and February 26 Defendants

Note: Top panel: the 9 Imperial Way faction members who appear in the right-wing organization source data and were not tried for the February 26 incident. Bottom panels: all 42 persons tried by court-martial for the February 26, 1936 coup attempt (of whom 18 also appear in organization data). Org: ✓ = person confirmed as a named member in the right-wing organization source data. Feb. 26: sentence for those tried; blank for those not tried. "Executed" denotes death by firing squad (July 1936 for active-duty officers; August 1937 for Isobe, Muranaka, Kita, Nishida, Shibukawa, Mizukami). "Life" denotes life imprisonment, later commuted. "Indirect" = convicted as indirect participant (*hobanjō*). "(dism.)" = dismissed; "(fmr.)" = formerly held rank; "(reserve)" = reserve status. NP Link: connection to the northern periphery through home prefecture or military posting. **Bold** home prefectures are within the NP. "—" = no NP connection or information not available. Sources: Shillony (1973), Kitaoka (2021), Kitabatake court records, Nagata (2014), Kotobank biographical database.

Org	Name	Romanized	Rank	Home	Division	NP
	草間勇	Kusama Isamu	1st Lt.	—	2nd Div.	Posted
	植木勇	Ueki Isamu	Captain	—	2nd Div.	Posted
	寺尾征太露	Terao Seitarō	Capt. (Art.)	—	3rd Div.	—
	黒田武文	Kuroda Takefumi	1st Lt. (Air)	—	3rd Div.	—
	片岡俊郎	Kataoka Toshirō	1st Lt.	—	7th Div.	—
	杉野良任	Sugino Yoshitō	1st Lt.	—	5th Regt, 8th Div.	Posted
	冨永良男	Tominaga Yoshio	Lt. Col.	—	8th Div.	Posted
	遠山弥兵衛	Tōyama Yahei	1st Lt.	—	5th Regt, 8th Div.	Posted
✓	小川三郎	Ogawa Saburō	Captain	—	11th Div.	—
	江藤五郎	Etō Gorō	1st Lt.	—	11th Div.	—
	三木正明	Miki Masaaki	1st Lt.	—	11th Div.	—
✓	若松満則	Wakamatsu Mitsunori	Captain	—	12th Div.	—
	戸次俊雄	Hetsugi Toshio	1st Lt.	—	12th Div.	—
	伊知地進	Ichiji Susumu	Captain	—	12th Div.	—
	竹中英雄	Takenaka Hideo	1st Lt.	—	12th Div.	—
	佐々木二郎	Sasaki Jirō	Captain	—	19th Div.	—
	朝山小二郎	Asayama Kojirō	Capt. (Art.)	—	19th Div.	—
	福永憲	Fukunaga Ken	Captain	—	20th Div.	—
	福井寛治	Fukui Kanji	1st Lt.	—	20th Div.	—
	松浦義教	Matsuura Yoshinori	1st Lt.	—	Sendai school	Posted
	板垣徹	Itagaki Tetsu	1st Lt.	—	Toyohashi school	—
			Civilian and student suspects (Nagata registry)			
✓	加藤春海	Katō Harumi	Civilian (Tokyo Univ)	—	Ishinjuku; Ishin Dōshikai	—
✓	竹島維夫	Takeshima Korewa	Civilian	—	Wakamatsu Ishinjuku	Wakamatsu
✓	岩澤衛門	Iwazawa Eimon	Civilian	—	Wakamatsu Ishinjuku	Wakamatsu
✓	松平紹光	Matsudaira Tsugumitsu	Maj. (Inf.)	—	Chuo Univ kakuchū-shōkō	—
✓	杉田省吾	Sugita Shōgo	Civilian	—	Ishin Dōshikai	—
	古賀城	Koga Jō	Civilian	—	—	—
	石原廣一郎	Ishihara Hiroichirō	Civilian	—	—	—
	大塚正雄	Ōtsuka Masao	Civilian	—	Aikoku Rōnō Dōshikai	—
✓	宮浦修三	Miyaura Shūzō	Student (Chuo Univ)	—	Aikoku Gakusei Renmei	—

Table A.26: February 26 Investigated Suspects (Not Tried)

Note: Officers and civilians investigated in connection with the February 26, 1936 coup attempt but not brought to trial. Org: ✓ = person confirmed as a named member in the right-wing organization source data. Division assignment for officers reflects their posting at the time of the incident; for civilian suspects, the column lists the principal organizational affiliation per Nagata (2014). NP: "Posted" indicates the officer's division was headquartered in the northern periphery (2nd Division: Sendai; 8th Division: Hirosaki; Sendai school); "Wakamatsu" indicates a Kōdō Ishinjuku (Wakamatsu, Fukushima, NP) affiliation. Among officer suspects, six of 21 (29%) were posted to NP divisions, with the 8th Division supplying the largest single contingent (3 suspects); among civilian suspects, three of nine had Kōdō Ishinjuku (Wakamatsu) ties. Sources: Kitabatake court records, Nagata (2014).



Figure A.25: February 26 Participant Network in the Right-Wing Organization Registry

Note: Bipartite person–organization graph for all February 26 participants in the source registry: the 42 persons tried by court-martial plus 30 investigated suspects (officer and civilian), using organizations active before February 1936 per Nagata (2014). Person nodes (rounded boxes): black fill = NP-affiliated (home prefecture in NP, division posting in NP, or member of an NP-located organization); gray fill = otherwise. The number below each name is normalized betweenness centrality (0–100). "Mil." / "Fmr. Mil." marks active-duty / formerly active military. Organization nodes (circles): dark-gray fill with thicker border = NP-located organization; white fill = non-NP. Number inside each circle is the total membership count per the registry. The Wakamatsu cluster at upper-center (NP org "10": Kōdō Ishinjuku) links four civilian/officer suspects (Katō Harumi, Takeshima Korewa, Matsudaira Tsugumitsu, Iwazawa Eimon). Persons with zero registry-recorded organizational ties are omitted from the layout. Generated by `analysis/scripts/39_226_network.R`.

Org	Name	Romanized	Rank	Home	NP Link
			Core leaders		
✓	東條英機	Tōjō Hideki	General	**Iwate**	Home (born Tokyo)
✓	杉山元	Sugiyama Hajime	Field Marshal	Fukuoka	—
✓	小磯國昭	Koiso Kuniaki	General	**Yamagata**	Home (born Tochigi)
✓	南次郎	Minami Jirō	General	Ōita	—
✓	武藤章	Mutō Akira	Lt. General	Kumamoto	—
✓	寺内壽一	Terauchi Hisaichi	Field Marshal	Yamaguchi	—
✓	長勇	Chō Isamu	Lt. General	Fukuoka	—
✓	影佐禎昭	Kagesa Sadaaki	Lt. General	Hiroshima	—
✓	永田鐵山	Nagata Tetsuzan	Maj. General	Nagano	—
✓	橋本欣五郎	Hashimoto Kingorō	Colonel	Fukuoka	—
✓	辻政信	Tsuji Masanobu	Colonel	Ishikawa	—
			Prominent members		
✓	畑俊六	Hata Shunroku	Field Marshal	**Fukushima**	Home (born Tokyo)
✓	板垣征四郎	Itagaki Seishirō	General	**Iwate**	Home
✓	根本博	Nemoto Hiroshi	Lt. General	**Fukushima**	Home
✓	安達二十三	Adachi Hatazō	Lt. General	Ishikawa	—
✓	樋口季一郎	Higuchi Kiichirō	Lt. General	Hyōgo	—
✓	池田純久	Ikeda Sumihisa	Lt. General	Ōita	—
✓	今井武夫	Imai Takeo	Maj. General	Nagano	—
✓	岩畔豪雄	Iwakuro Hideo	Maj. General	Hiroshima	—
✓	河本大作	Kawamoto Daisaku	Colonel	Hyōgo	—
✓	秋草俊	Akikusa Shun	Maj. General	Tochigi	—
✓	富永恭次	Tominaga Kyōji	Lt. General	Nagasaki	—

Table A.27: Core Control Faction Personnel Appearing in Organization Data

Note: The 21 core Control Faction (*Tōseiha*) leaders and prominent members who appear as members in the right-wing organization source data, used in the faction–organization comparison (Section 3.3). Org: ✓ = person confirmed as a named member in the organization source data (all listed here). NP Link: connection to the northern periphery; **bold** home prefectures are within the NP. Several NP-registered members were born elsewhere (noted in parentheses). Sources: Shillony (1973), Kitaoka (2021), Kotobank biographical database.